

Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy: USAID Policies in Haiti

by Laurie Richardson

A Report from Grassroots International

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Acknowledgments

This research would not have been possible without the participation of the individuals and organizations that offered their insights, experience, and analysis of Haiti's food-security situation and their prescriptions for its improvement. They are listed in the bibliography and should be consulted as resources. I would like especially to thank the peasant producers and organizers who, in spite of pressing economic difficulties and uncertainty regarding their physical security, have consistently welcomed me into their communities, fields, and homes. Their courage and determination to harvest not only food but participatory democracy have been among my life's greatest inspirations.

For technical support as well as encouragement, I would like to thank the Haitian Information Bureau and the Haitian Platform for Alternative Development. I would note that the widespread critiques I heard from Haitians of their own government's complicity in the policies criticized here are not fully represented in this report. That is because the primary audience for this report is the U.S. public and U.S. policymakers.

Acknowledgment is also due the librarian at the USAID library in Port-au-Prince, who facilitated my access to agency documents. As for the representatives of CARE and PADF who agreed to be interviewed for the report, I thank them for their time and candor. Although this report is overwhelmingly critical of the approaches of these two institutions and that of their major funder, the U.S. government, I hope this report fuels further discussion, dialogue, and introspection rather than hostility.

Finally, I would like to thank Grassroots International for embarking on this project, sticking with it through its numerous difficulties, and remaining committed to improving food security in Haiti through advocacy and through direct support for Haitian organizations.

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Preface: "Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy" Revisited
February 2010

Some of the advice for how Haiti ought to rebuild after the earthquake sounds hauntingly familiar, echoing the same bad development advice that Haiti has received for decades – even before the nation faced its current devastating situation. To avoid repeating the past failures, we would be wise to review how previous aid models led down the wrong path.

Twelve years ago, Grassroots International released a research study entitled "Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy: USAID Policies in Haiti." Offering an in-depth examination of USAID development policies in Haiti, the study concluded that, as the title suggests, official aid actually damaged the very aspects of Haitian society it was allegedly trying to fix – namely it created a lack of democracy and too much dependency.

The study was particularly critical of the development community for making Haiti into a net food importer when it had been nearly self-sufficient, and in fact a major rice producer. Despite, or because of, years of aid programs, and structural adjustment policies imposed by international financial institutions and donor countries, the study found that Haiti's food dependency was actually *increasing*. This disturbing result was partially caused by subsidized food aid programs which fed transnational agribusiness corporations but didn't help Haitians grow food for their families.

Sadly, much of that 12-year-old study could have been written today.

As recently as 2007, a USAID agronomist told Grassroots International that there simply was no future for Haiti's small farm sector – a callous prognosis for the nation's three million-plus small farmers (of a population of 9 million). In a nutshell, USAID's plan for Haiti and many other poor countries is to push farmers out of subsistence agriculture as quickly as possible. Farmers that might otherwise be supported to grow food are frequently engaged as laborers in work-for-food programs. Rather than pursue innovative programs to keep rural food markets local and support food sovereignty, misguided aid programs encourage farmers to grow higher value export crops such as cashews, coffee and more recently, jatropha for agrofuels.

USAID policies seek to make optimum use of Haiti's "comparative advantage" – i.e. its abundant cheap labor – by funneling displaced farmers into low-wage assembly plants in the cities or near the Dominican border. The result is staggering levels of rural-to-urban migration, leading to dangerous overcrowding of Port-au-Prince. Passed by the U.S. Congress in 2006, programs such as the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE) have lured transnational companies to Haiti with

offers of no tariff exports on textiles assembled in Haitian factories to capitalize on this pool of laborers.

In the name of rebuilding Haiti, will USAID and other large donor and aid agencies pursue this same formula over the coming years? Or will it take a different tack that includes Haiti's vibrant network of civil society organizations as central to rebuilding efforts?

While there is widespread hand-wringing in the media that rebuilding efforts are hampered by the desperate poverty and lack of infrastructure, there is very little introspection about whether aid strategies and development and monetary policies may have actually *contributed to* this impoverishment and how those ought to change. Such critiques are usually relegated to alternative media sources like *The Nation* and Democracy Now, or groups that have long-standing relations with grassroots Haitian movements.

Export-driven aid and development policies were a bad idea before the earthquake; they are a *terrible* idea now. A wage freeze advocated by the International Monetary Fund shortly after the earthquake is simply inhumane and out of touch with reality.

Since our 1998 report, we note these troubling trends:

- Food aid and food import dependency in Haiti has continued to rise despite the fact that the UN World Food Programme has been operating in Haiti since 1969. In 1980, Haiti imported 16,000 metric tons of rice. After two successive phases of trade liberalization, by 2004 Haiti was importing 270,000 metric tons – a 17 fold increase. When prices of imported foods spiked in 2007, hungry families rebelled. Policies advancing food sovereignty are few, although we note the Herculean work of many Haitian popular and non-governmental organizations in strengthening the ability of Haitian small farmers to grow food for their families and local markets.
- Rural-to-urban migration had risen annually by nearly 4.5%. Although this trend showed immediate reversal after the earthquake, sprawling cities like Port-au-Prince had expanded rapidly with shoddily constructed and vulnerable slums. These neighborhoods were buried by mud in 2008's hurricanes and are now crushed under rubble.
- Haiti's ecology continues to deteriorate – demonstrated by the tremendous loss of life and soil in recent hurricanes. Forests barely cover 2% of Haitian territory. Between 1990 and 2000, the UNDP reports that natural forest cover declined by 50 percent.
- Promises of a robust assembly plant/*maquila* sector that could absorb unemployed farmers – spurred by the HOPE initiatives – have fallen short of expectations, creating far fewer jobs than imagined and at even lower wages than hoped. Worldwide competition for these assembly plants remains fierce; investors have found more attractive places than Haiti to set up shop. Casting further gloom on this sector is the current slow-down in the global economy. Fewer assembly

plants may be necessary and the destruction of Haiti's infrastructure makes it unlikely that plants would relocate there.

- The experience of living with foreign troops has been difficult for Haiti. The UN peace-keeping force, MINUSTAH, has received mixed reports – at best. Over the six years it has stationed between 6000 and 9000 troops in Haiti at enormous public expense. Many Haitians describe their situation as a military occupation – harkening back to frequent occupations in Haiti's history. The Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations (POHDH), a Grassroots International partner, has documented numerous human rights abuses by MINUSTAH personnel. Development plans of some donor countries will rely on foreign troops for implementation, which may lead to more dependency and social unrest. A cautionary note about militarized aid comes from wary Haitians quoted in the media: "We asked for 10,000 doctors and nurses; we got 10,000 soldiers."
- Haiti's foreign debt continued to rise from $1.2 to $1.5 billion in the period from 2003 – 2009. International lenders insisted on balancing budgets even if that meant cutting essential social services. Thankfully, there is now some movement towards debt cancellation.

What is a sound rehabilitation plan going forward? Camille Chalmers of Grassroots International's partner the Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA) has made some suggestions in these early days after the quake. Instead of traditional agency-to-agency aid that turns Haitians into "aid recipients" rather than protagonists of their recovery, this needs to be a people-to-people effort – what Chalmers describes as "structural solidarity".

Chalmers notes that this reconstruction can't be relegated to simply physical infrastructure. He asks that we work holistically to:

a) Overcome illiteracy (45% of the population);
b) Build an effective public school system that is both free and that respects the history, culture, and ecosystems of Haiti;
c) Reverse the environmental crisis and rebuild Haiti's 30 watersheds with the massive participation of young people and international volunteers;
d) Fight child mortality, malnutrition, and maternal mortality (currently 630 women per 100,000 live births) by constructing a new public health system which brings together modern and traditional medicine and offers quality, affordable primary services to 100% of the population;
e) Reconstruct a new capital city based on a different logic: humane and balanced urbanization, respect for workers and true wealth creators, privileging public transportation, parks that maximize biodiversity, urban agriculture, and popular arts;
f) Move toward food sovereignty based on comprehensive agrarian reform, prioritizing agricultural investments that respect ecosystems, biodiversity, and the needs and culture of small farmers;
g) Cut dependency ties with Washington, the European Union, and others. Abandon policies issued by different versions of the "Washington Consensus";
h) End MINUSTAH and instead build people-to-people solidarity brigades.

What would a holistic rehabilitation and development plan of this nature require? Much more than money! It would require a reversal of policies which are at their heart counter to healthy, sustainable development. It would mean a stop to attempts to pry Haiti's economy open to imports; it would mean an end to balancing Haiti's budget by cutting health and education spending; it would mean implementing policies for environmentally-friendly food sovereignty so that Haitians can eat the food they grow in fields that hold the soil; it would mean a massive virtuous circle of support for *both* the governmental and non-governmental sectors so that they can grow strong together.

While many aspects of Haiti's reality have stayed the same since Grassroots International published "Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy" in 1998, others have changed for the better. Some aid agencies, such as CARE, took to heart many of the findings in the study and altered the way they provide aid. For example, in 2007 CARE gave up $45 million in annual federal funding because, as it said, "American food aid is not only plagued with inefficiencies, but also may hurt some of the very poor people it aims to help." Others expanded partnerships with Haitian social movements and utilized local expertise to inform their programs.

An essential part of Grassroots International's work with the Haitian people over the coming years will be to try to keep the development industry honest and advocate for exactly this kind of long-term, holistic aid. At the same time, we'll continue to build the kind of people-to-people solidarity that Chalmers suggests – helping grassroots organizations steer Haiti's development agenda through the challenging decades ahead.

Nikhil Aziz, Executive Director
Grassroots International

Preface

The September 1991 military coup d'etat that sent populist President Jean-Bertrand Aristide into exile was a devastating blow to Haiti's vibrant pro-democracy movement. Prior to the coup, citizens' groups drawn predominantly from Haiti's impoverished majority sat poised to help the Aristide-led government enact policies to address their most basic needs, a long-delayed reward for years of costly struggle. The pro-democracy movement had toppled the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986. Activists had gone on to resist a series of unpopular governments, winning the right to the first free elections in Haiti's history. In those 1990 elections, their candidate—the populist priest of the poor—had swept to a resounding victory over a candidate backed heavily by the United States government.

President Aristide's brief reign had generated great expectations. His government advocated a range of popular initiatives, from literacy and public health programs to minimum-wage hikes and agrarian reform. Many of those efforts were to rely on citizens' groups to carry them out. Foreign governments and international aid agencies pledged millions of dollars in support.

The coup sent President Aristide into exile, forced pro-democracy activists into hiding, and compelled international donors to suspend much of the funding destined for popular initiatives.

That was when Grassroots International began its work in Haiti. An international aid and information agency with a history of providing humanitarian assistance during political crises, Grassroots International began an Emergency Human Rights Program in Haiti. The Program had the stated goals of helping Haitian groups document the military government's human rights abuses, disseminating that information in the United States, and providing emergency assistance to peasant organizations trying to protect members forced into hiding and sustain their families during the repression.

The return of Haiti's democratically elected government in 1994, accompanied by U.S. and international troops, brought some relief to a terrorized people. But it came at a price. The Aristide government, as a condition of its return to Haiti, agreed to a series of economic reform measures—structural adjustment programs—long demanded by the U.S. government, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Those programs drastically limited the government's flexibility in the areas of economic and social policy.

If defending human rights was the urgent task facing the pro-democracy movement during military rule, a new issue now took center stage: food security, the assurance of an adequate, reliable, and sustainable diet to all of a nation's people. With hunger and malnutrition widespread and economic restructuring programs further exacerbating inequality, Grassroots International in 1995 reshaped its aid program to support Haitian peasant organizations' efforts to rebuild and strengthen the agricultural economy.

Grassroots International's new Haiti Food Security Program led us to the present research project. Grassroots' Haitian partners were reporting that the main obstacles to their efforts to increase food security were U.S.-backed aid programs and the structural adjustment policies of which they were a part.

The research was conducted by Laurie Richardson, a Grassroots International Research Associate and writer based in Port-au-Prince. Fluent in Haitian Creole, she has been studying the impact of U.S. policy on Haiti's pro-democracy movement since 1991. For this project Ms. Richardson traveled throughout Haiti's Northwest and Artibonite regions interviewing hundreds of peasants, members of Parliament, economists, government officials, community organizers, development workers, agronomists, and representatives of international private voluntary organizations. Extensive bibliographic research—including some conducted at the USAID library in Port-au-Prince—allowed her to study the philosophy behind USAID programs in Haiti, particularly food-aid and jobs-creation programs.

This study investigates the ways in which the large U.S. aid program in Haiti is undermining rather than improving food security for the majority of Haitians. This report was researched and written by Ms. Richardson; Grassroots International was responsible for editing the report and collaborating in the writing of the Executive Summary and Recommendations sections of the report.

The conclusions should be a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers whose actions are increasing hunger in Haiti.

Tim Wise, Executive Director
Grassroots International

Executive Summary

In 1996 Grassroots International began an extensive six-month research project in Haiti. Our primary objective was to understand how programs funded by the U.S. government are affecting food security in Haiti. Given the massive scope of those programs since the restoration of democratic rule three years ago, our goal was to see for ourselves what impact programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were having on Haiti's poor, particularly small farmers and peasants.

Despite glowing reports from USAID that its field programs in Haiti are succeeding, our research found that those programs are not furthering equitable development, nor are they increasing food security. Three years ago the United States sent troops to Haiti with the stated intention of restoring democracy. The sad reality is that current international aid policies are robbing the Haitian people of their independence—and the very community initiative that is the cornerstone of autonomy. Most troubling, in this hemisphere's hungriest nation, U.S. policies are undermining, instead of enhancing, the ability of Haitian farmers to grow and market their goods.

Grassroots International's research documents how U.S. government policies and aid programs interfere with the production of local food crops and create a dangerous dependence on U.S. food imports. Grassroots International also found serious problems with food aid and other assistance programs and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) implementing them. They are, in fact, derailing community-based organizations that are the real engines of progress and Haiti's only hope for sustainable development.

Foreign aid programs—and the "free-market" economic policies that they are conditioned upon—are exacerbating social tensions in Haiti, as was shown by the anti-austerity strikes in mid-January of this year. Ultimately, such development strategies are threatening to undermine Haiti's chance to build democracy by driving a wedge between the government of President René Préval and the Haitian people.

These policies are also contributing to the exodus of Haitians from rural areas. As the World Bank stated unapologetically in a recent draft strategy paper, the rural majority has "only two possibilities: work in the industrial or service sector, or emigrate."

Summary Findings

Throughout Haiti, peasant farmers, agronomists, economists, and elected officials are criticizing USAID programs as being largely detrimental to the long-term ability of the nation to feed its population. Grassroots International's primary findings are as follows:

1. Drastically reduced tariffs on imported food—which the U.S. government has insisted upon as a condition for aid—are flooding Haiti with cheap food, undercutting prices for locally grown products.

Throughout the rural areas surveyed by Grassroots International, farmers reported tremendous difficulty competing with cheap, subsidized foodstuffs imported under new tariff schemes. In the case of rice, for example, dramatic reductions in tariffs since 1995 have made imported rice cheaper than before, undermining Haitian rice farmers. Not only do these imports reduce the price that Haitian farmers receive for their rice, they also depress the prices they receive for other key cereals, such as millet and corn. Spiraling food imports also consume much-needed hard currency; rice purchases now eat up 15% of Haiti's import budget.

2. The U.S.-based NGOs that carry out most USAID programs do not adequately consult or coordinate with local, regional, and national Haitian government authorities.

Grassroots International's survey revealed consistent complaints that foreign aid programs, generally implemented by private agencies such as CARE and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), largely bypass relevant Haitian governmental entities, often putting resulting development projects at odds with stated national, regional, and local priorities.

Given the size and scope of international aid in Haiti—approximately 60% of the Haitian government's budget comes from external sources—this not only produces ineffective development programs but also undercuts the very democratic process the U.S. government says it wants to build.

3. USAID programs do not respond to Haiti's stated priority of revitalizing national agricultural production; only 4.3% of USAID's four-year US$ 443 million aid package is destined for agricultural development.

Although Haiti's government and community organizations have clearly stated that their top development priority is revitalizing agriculture, USAID is devoting only 4.3% of its four-year budget to agricultural projects. By contrast, food aid makes up 13%. The failure to invest in agricultural development further weakens the efforts of Haitian farmers to increase domestic production.

4. U.S. food aid depresses local prices for basic grains, reducing incentives for Haitian farmers to grow them.

Food security analysts acknowledge that massive deliveries of U.S. wheat to Haiti's government under the Public Law (PL) 480 Title III program drive down prices for rice, millet, and other cereals in Haiti. Grassroots International's research found evidence supporting widespread complaints that PL 480 Title II food aid—aid distributed by U.S. NGOs—also undercuts the prices for locally produced staples. This has discouraged Haitian farmers from growing basic grains, increasing Haiti's dependence on imported food.

5. Food aid shifts consumption patterns away from locally produced goods in favor of imported goods.

This well-documented phenomenon was clearly evident in the communities Grassroots International surveyed. For example, the massive distribution of surplus U.S. wheat has fostered a taste for products that can only be produced with this imported staple. As Haitians

incorporate these products into their diets, growers of local grains such as corn—which grows well in Haiti's mountainous terrain—have seen shrinking demand for their products. This breeds dependency, undermines food security and creates an unsustainable reliance on imported food.

6. Private aid agencies consistently operated jobs-creation programs in rural areas at key planting and harvesting times, pulling people out of their fields with the lure of relatively high short-term wages.

Peasant farmers surveyed by Grassroots International repeatedly complained about temporary, NGO-supervised employment projects. Short-term projects were run by PADF in rural areas during periods of peak agricultural activity. The relatively high wages paid by these projects lured farmers and farm laborers out of their fields. This in turn reduced the amount of land planted, left ripe crops unharvested, and increased the labor costs for those farmers who tried to compete with wage levels paid in the jobs programs.

Grassroots International also found that many of these infrastructure projects were poorly designed and had little long-term impact. In one case, local residents were paid to dig drainage ditches during rainy season. Runoff from the rains filled the ditches with rocks and soil almost as soon as the project was completed.

Camille Chalmers, head of the Haitian Platform for Alternative Development (one of Grassroots International's partner organizations), observed, "We saw with our own eyes the quantity of rice which is ripe but rotting in the fields because the peasants don't have enough money or can't find people to work in the fields. [This] creates the paradox of rice rotting in the fields in a country where there is hunger."

7. USAID-funded programs stifle local initiative with short-term offers of free food and employment, creating cycles of dependency among Haitian farmers.

Over and over, Grassroots International heard complaints from local peasant and community leaders that USAID-funded programs for jobs creation are changing Haitians' attitudes about community work. These programs pay people for work they used to perform out of a sense of concern for their villages. Grassroots International also heard consistent reports of poor families and small farmers who began to rely heavily on food aid distributions and paid less attention to increasing their own food production.

"Instead of spending two or three years teaching people to fish, [these NGOs] prefer to give them a 'fish' every day.... The people who are working to produce ... come to the conclusion that it is better to go get a plate of food, a fish, instead of going out to fish themselves," notes Haitian Senator Samuel Madistin from the rice-growing Artibonite region.

8. Private aid agencies frequently fail to consult or work with local community organizations; instead they either directly implement projects themselves or work closely with discredited local elites.

Though most development professionals acknowledge that the involvement of local communities is essential to the success of any development project, U.S.-funded programs in Haiti regularly fail to consult with or involve appropriate local leaders and organizations. In com-

munity after community, Haitians painted a picture of U.S. aid workers as outside "experts" who impose their own projects with little regard or respect for local priorities or institutions.

More disturbing still, Grassroots International found a consistent pattern of unsavory alliances between U.S. agencies and local elites associated with the deposed military regime. The choice of such "partners" by U.S. agencies not only produces ineffective development projects; it also destroys democracy at the local level by reinforcing the power of undemocratic leaders at the expense of democratic, community-based organizations.

The Role of U.S. Agencies

One of the most troubling findings of Grassroots International's research was the consistently negative role played by the U.S. NGOs responsible for implementing much of USAID's Haiti program. The two primary implementing agencies for food-aid and jobs-creation programs were CARE and PADF. Grassroots International's investigation revealed consistent complaints about their role and their effectiveness.

The following flaws were of particular concern:

- failure to consult with and involve local communities in the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects;
- failure to identify correctly and respond to local needs;
- failure to sufficiently monitor the impact and effectiveness of projects and make needed changes;
- frequent selection of Haitian counterparts who not only lack community support but are closely associated with the former military government; and
- failure to coordinate with local and regional Haitian government bodies, thereby creating projects at odds with stated Haitian priorities.

At a time when U.S. foreign aid programs are under fire from conservatives, the community of private aid agencies in the United States has a particular obligation to ensure that all funds, whether from taxpayers or private contributors, promote long-term, community-based solutions to hunger. Projects must foster self-reliance and community initiative, strengthen local democratic institutions, and break cycles of dependency. The programs Grassroots International reviewed in Haiti rarely contributed to these goals; in many cases, they did the opposite.

Grassroots International, which as a matter of policy does not accept U.S. government funds, believes that one of the strongest factors contributing to private aid agencies' ineffectiveness in Haiti is their dependence on U.S. government funding for programs. This often leaves private aid organizations more beholden to U.S. government policies than they are to the communities they are trying to assist.

In Haiti, this has led CARE, PADF, and others to support projects that are clearly undermining rather than contributing to Haitian efforts to achieve food security.

Recommendations

Based on its findings, Grassroots International recommends that the U.S. government and U.S. agencies operating in Haiti adhere to one basic principle: *Aid policies and programs should support the goal of enhancing Haiti's food security by supporting, not undermining, Haitian food producers.*

Specifically, Grassroots International recommends the following policy changes:

1. The U.S. government should not condition its aid to the Haitian government on the implementation of policies that undermine Haitian food producers and weaken the development of democratic institutions in Haiti.

2. The U.S. government should end pressure on Haiti to reduce tariffs, particularly on food. Haitian food producers should be protected from subsidized U.S. imports while they rebuild their productive capacity.

3. Policies should cease to emphasize short-term emergency programs, including jobs and food aid, in favor of long-term, small-scale development.

4. All programs should be designed and carried out with the full participation and approval of the affected communities, in ways that strengthen Haitian organizations and institutions—including the Haitian government—particularly at the local level.

5. Aid programs should support Haitian food producers by increasing their access to:

- land, by supporting a comprehensive land-reform program designed to transfer quality, arable land to small farmers;
- affordable credit;
- appropriate technology and training;
- soil restoration and reforestation programs, to improve soil fertility;
- farm animals, particularly indigenous Creole pigs;
- seeds, tools, and farm machinery to help recapitalize peasant households; and
- food storage and marketing support.

Conclusion

Haitians are a determined people. Their commitment to democracy is tenacious. They have overthrown the tyrannical Duvalier dictatorship. They have resisted the brutal attempt to halt their march toward democracy, preventing the military coup from taking hold. Now, with formal democracy restored, the Haitian people are increasingly focusing their determination on building an economy and society that responds first to the needs of the Haitian poor.

With appropriate support, Haitian farmers *can* increase production of and access to affordable basic foodstuffs. Haiti's people, the majority of whom still make their living from the land, want desperately to develop their own self-reliant communities and a nation that is not dependent on foreign funds or food.

If the United States government and U.S. NGOs are truly committed to building democracy in Haiti, they must rethink their current misguided policies and practices, which are undermining both food security and democracy in Haiti.

1 The Roots of the Food Crisis

"CARE has been 'helping' people in the Northwest for decades. But each year, the misery of the people of the Northwest increases. What is the real impact of this aid? To make people more dependent, more vulnerable, more on the margins?. . . The aid is not given in such a way as to give the people responsibility, to make them less dependent. . . . This is what you call 'commercializing' poverty. . . . The people's misery should not be marketed."

—Artibonite Senator Samuel Madistin[1]

The international community's "aid for development" to Haiti more than tripled with the return of ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in October 1994.[2] Overall, the international community pledged more than US$ 2.5 billion over four years with the stated purpose of supporting economic recovery and democratic restoration in Haiti.[3] Total aid disbursed between October 1994 and November 1996 topped one billion dollars.[4] The largest donor by far was the United States which, via the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), provided US$ 344.24 million, or 33% of the total.[5] (See Tables in Appendix.)

This international aid represented a massive influx into the Haitian economy, the equivalent of approximately 30% of Haiti's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each of these years.[6] This would be similar to pumping $2.4 trillion into the U.S. economy. Yet, despite this deluge of "development aid," observers on the ground agree that any concrete, positive economic impact has been hard to detect, either at the macro-economic level (i.e. growth) or in the living standards or food security of the rural and urban poor, the vast majority of Haiti's people.

For the hemisphere's hungriest nation, this is nothing short of tragic. A groundswell of popular support brought Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1990 on a populist platform largely designed to put the needs of Haiti's poor first. The 1991 military coup d'etat derailed those dreams. Yet President Aristide's return in 1994 rekindled Haitians' hopes that their democratically elected government could help them attend to their basic needs, particularly the need for food security.

More than two years after President Aristide's return, it is clear that international aid programs are feeding dependency in Haiti while starving Haiti's fledgling democracy. Reports of famine are now emerging from the country's Northwest, long dependent on U.S. food aid. Protest strikes and demonstrations in opposition to U.S.-backed economic reforms have sprung up across the country. Voter turnout for much-anticipated local and Senatorial elections in April 1997 reached only about 10%, which was widely interpreted as a measure of Haitian disillusionment with a democratic process that brings them little control over their lives and scant hope that their leaders can or will address their most urgent needs.

One of the reasons U.S. aid has contributed so little to economic development and food security in Haiti is that it has come with strict conditions. It is widely recognized that the *sine qua non* for the international community's support for the return of President Aristide to Haiti—both the military intervention and the entire economic assistance package that followed—was the pledge of the Aristide government to adhere to a structural adjustment program (SAP). In particular, over 50% of the four-year pledged aid package is in the form of loans from international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).[7] These loans are conditioned on the Haitian government's continuing enactment of structural adjustment policies designed to respond to the interests of the donor countries which control the IFIs rather than to the majority of the Haitian population.[8]

"Agricultural production has generally stagnated or declined since the 1950s. The downward slide accelerated during the 1980s and reached crisis proportions with the recent coup d'etat, when repression and soaring inflation further decapitalized the sector."

Among the key elements of the SAP being applied in Haiti are the lowering and eventual elimination of import tariffs; the elimination of price controls and government subsidies; and the commitment to restrict the role of the state and to instead embrace private-sector-led development, including a heavy reliance on non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Each of these elements has had a negative impact on food security in Haiti.

This report examines the flaws in U.S. policies and aid programs since President Aristide's return in 1994. It focuses on two of the largest USAID programs during that time, food aid and jobs creation, while also examining the overall impact of U.S. economic policies toward Haiti. It offers recommendations, mostly from Haitian organizations, for how aid programs need to change to better achieve food security. It provides examples of some creative and cost-effective community-based initiatives by Haitian farmers.

Haiti's Declining Agricultural Production

Haiti is a predominantly agrarian nation, where 65% of the economically active population depends directly or indirectly on the agricultural sector for its livelihood.[9] As recently as the early 1960s, agricultural production employed 90% of the population and accounted for 90% of the nation's exports.[10] Yet agricultural production has generally stagnated or declined since the 1950s. The downward slide accelerated during the 1980s and reached crisis proportions with the recent coup d'etat, when repression and soaring inflation further decapitalized the sector. Agricultural production currently accounts for only one third of Haiti's GDP.[11]

The resulting socio-economic consequences have been devastating: the loss of jobs, the shortage of food, the decrease in state revenues, and the massive uprooting of the rural population as displaced farmers swell the urban slums or risk their lives to travel abroad in search of another way to support themselves and their families.



Nearly self-sufficient in food production until the middle of this century, Haiti has seen its reliance on food imports jump from 10% in the 1970s to 23% in 1981 and 42% in 1993.[12] The deficit of national food production as a proportion of consumption is currently estimated at between 45% and 50%.[13] The widespread food insecurity has been borne largely by the vast majority of the population living under the poverty line (estimates range from 66% to 85%)[14] who lack the resources to purchase imported food.

In addition to the negative consequences for domestic food consumption, the agricultural sector's declining state has led to a plummeting of agricultural exports which historically played a key role in providing the state with revenues.[15] Haiti was the number one sugar producer in the hemisphere during the colonial period. Until 1949, it was the third largest coffee exporter in the world, with 12% of the market share. The country now imports sugar and coffee exports are very low.[16]

The reasons for this crisis in the agricultural sector and the resulting deterioration in food security are multiple. Some of the key factors follow:

◘ **A difficult and deteriorating environment:** Over half of Haiti's land consists of mountainous terrain with some slopes greater than 40%, unsuitable for cultivation.[17] As a result of deforestation fueled by increasing poverty, only 3% of Haiti's original forest cover remains.[18] This, combined with farming of heavily sloped lands and torrential downpours, has hastened erosion. The estimates of arable land lost to erosion range from 6,000 to 15,000 hectares annually.[19]

◘ **A repressive and parasitic state that has failed to invest in a coherent plan for agricultural development, while siphoning off resources from the sector:** Since the colonial era, government authorities have extracted wealth and resources from agriculture, whether in the form of raw materials (during the colonial era), heavy taxes, or simple extortion. The few productive investments in infrastructure have been poorly maintained. Only 45% of the nation's irrigable lands are irrigated, and poorly so.[20] The nation's transport system is underdeveloped and poorly maintained, with secondary and tertiary roads often impassable during the rainy season. This renders transport difficult and expensive and contributes to post-harvest losses estimated at between 20% and 30% of production.[21] State extension services are virtually non-existent.

◘ **An archaic land tenure system:** Most agricultural production occurs on tiny parcels. Sixty-one percent of land holdings are smaller than one hectare, and 95% of cultivated land is farmed in parcels smaller than three hectares.[22] Many farmers work a combination of dispersed parcels. Land rents are high, sharecropping is prevalent, and legal title is often no guarantee for a largely illiterate peasantry confronting repressive and exploitative rural elites. Precarious tenure over these small plots is a major constraint to increased production as it discourages investment in environmental conservation or other long-term productive improvements.[23]

◘ **Limited access to credit:** The little credit that exists for agricultural production is offered by the rural elite at usurious rates. A recent survey conducted by Haiti's largest peasant association found that interest rates began at 20% per month and sometimes reached 50% per month, or 600% per year.[24]

Limited access to productive inputs, combined with inadequate support for storage or marketing: Mechanized cultivation is almost non-existent, and although the most commonly used tool is the machete, it is not rare to encounter peasants who cannot afford even this rudimentary implement. The lack of local storage facilities forces peasants to sell their entire crop at harvest, when prices are at their lowest.

Feeding the Agricultural Crisis

Most analysts agree that national and international economic policies are largely responsible for Haiti's declining agricultural production. They point to three recent watershed events in Haiti's economic freefall: the wholesale eradication of the nation's stock of rustic, Creole pigs in the early 1980s; the 1991 coup d'etat; and the slashing of import tariffs in 1986 which marked the beginning of the application of a structural adjustment program.

In the early 1980s the deadly African Swine Fever swept through the Dominican Republic and entered Haiti. USAID and the Haitian government under Jean-Claude Duvalier responded by eliminating Haiti's Creole pig population—including a disease-free, quarantined herd destined for future repopulation efforts. In Haitian Creole, the

Socio-Economic Indicators in Haiti

Per capita GDP for Haiti's population of seven million inhabitants in 1994 was estimated at US$ 225, a level lower than that of 1981.[25] The poorer sectors of the peasantry were attempting to survive with an average per capita income of US$ 30 per year during the coup period.[26]

Infant and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world. According to the World Bank, the infant mortality rate is 84.2 deaths for 1,000 live births, the mortality rate for children under five is 130, and the maternal mortality rate is six per 1,000 live births.[27]

Malnutrition is serious and widespread. It was reported in 1992 that 50% of preschoolers were suffering from some degree of malnutrition, 3% from severe stages.[28]

Estimates for un- and underemployment for 1994/95 ranged from 60% to 70% of the active population.[29]

The current minimum wage stands at 36 gourdes per day, the equivalent of US$ 2.18 at this writing. Even for the small minority with access to employment paying the minimum wage, the extremely high cost of living renders their wages insufficient for supporting their families.

Only one-third of school age children are able to attend school.[30] Estimates of adult illiteracy range as high as 35%.[31]

Less than 60% of the population has access to primary health care.[32] Only 31% of all households have access to a source of potable water within 15 minutes of their homes.[33]

While 85% of Haiti's population live in absolute poverty, one half of one percent live in opulence, controlling 45% of the national income.[34]



pig is commonly referred to as "the peasant's savings bank." Historically, small farmers traded and bartered pigs for land, food, debt payment, and other cost-of-living expenses.

Using $23 million in funds from private North American agricultural interest groups, more than one million pigs valued at US$ 600 million were slaughtered. The planned repopulation of Haiti with U.S. pigs poorly suited to Haiti's conditions largely failed. The result: the decapitalization of hundreds of thousands of small-scale farmers. Haitian farmers still associate USAID with this uncompensated assault on their livelihood.

The coup d'etat had a similar effect on peasant households' economic viability, further decapitalizing them. The Ministry of Agriculture estimated that peasants experienced a 50% drop in real revenue during the coup, with average per capita income falling to a mere 500 gourdes (US$ 30) for the most impoverished.[35]

In many regions, the military and paramilitary units actively prevented farmers from cultivating their fields, and repression forced many heads of household into hiding, making farming difficult. The skewed application of the economic embargo against Haiti also hurt peasant farmers, as prices for many basic goods soared while incomes declined. The massive influx of foreign food—in the form of increased food aid and rice imports—further harmed peasant producers, undercutting their own production.

Structural Adjustment Arrives

The other watershed event for Haitian farmers was the slashing of import tariffs that accompanied Haiti's first structural adjustment program in 1986 following the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier. Until 1986, the Haitian government set high import tariffs on staple foodstuffs produced in Haiti as a way to protect Haitian producers from competition from outside (subsidized) products and to discourage the trade imbalance which would result from increased imports. Import tariffs averaged 150% on products such as sugar, rice, corn, sorghum, beans, poultry, and pork. Following the popular uprising that culminated in the ouster of Duvalier, the incoming military government of General Henri Namphy slashed import tariffs to an average of 57% in an attempt to curry favor with international donors calling for trade liberalization.[36] Furthermore, in an attempt to win the support of urban consumers, Namphy brought in shipments of imported food and flooded the country with cheap "Miami" rice. This posed a problem for producers in the Artibonite, because the imported rice was subsidized, so its selling price in the Haitian marketplace was below the production cost of Haitian rice.

> **"In 1986-87, there were boats with rice coming from Miami and landing in Gonaïves. To transport the rice to Port-au-Prince by truck, it went through the Artibonite, and the peasants attacked the trucks with machetes."**

The flood of imported food shifted domestic patterns of consumption. Consumers developed a taste for rice, and "Miami rice" in particular, and this change in tastes not only displaced other locally produced staples in the Haitian diet—including corn, sorghum, manioc, yam, and other tubers—it also provided stiff competition for local rice producers.

Bernard Ethéart, sociologist and head of Haiti's National Institute for Agrarian Reform, explained that "In 1986-87, there were boats with rice coming from Miami and landing in Gonaïves. To transport the

rice to Port-au-Prince by truck, it went through the Artibonite, and the peasants attacked the trucks with machetes. Since it was the military at the time which was importing the rice, they put soldiers on the trucks to shoot at the population. It was a real civil war."[37]

Household rice consumption doubled in the decade following Namphy's opening of the market,[38] making Haiti the number one per capita consumer of rice in the Western Hemisphere.[39] Much of this explosion in rice consumption was filled by imports, which jumped again during the coup when the government of Marc Bazin signed an accord with the controversial Ehrly Rice Corporation giving it the green light to import rice via its local subsidiaries.[40] Whereas rice imports totaled 5,000 MT in 1984, they were almost 200,000 MT in 1995.[41]

Subsequent to the return of the Aristide government in the fall of 1994, structural adjustment reforms were renewed. The mandatory 40% export tax and other restrictions on imports were abolished. Imports were assessed at market rates, and most customs fees were reduced to fall within the 0-15% range.[42] In August of 1996, customs fees were once again lowered to between 0% and 10%. "The growing liberalization of the economy which has characterized the period from 1995 onward has been accompanied by a strong progression of overall commercial imports and of food imports in particular," observes the National Coordination of Food Security (CNSA), the government's food security agency. CNSA lists insufficient protection of Haitian farmers as one the major impediments to increased food production.[43]

Food security experts at Haiti's CNSA argue that reduced import tariffs on rice are one of the major macro-economic constraints on the local production of all basic grains, not just rice. This is because the consumer price of rice and that of other cereals are closely linked. Cheap (subsidized) foreign imports compete with locally produced rice, driving down its market value and that of other staples such as millet and corn. This has a negative impact on the revenue of Haiti's peasantry overall.[44]

The structural adjustment program as a whole, begun in 1986 and implemented with renewed vigor following President Aristide's 1994 return, continues to undermine food security, particularly for Haiti's rural majority. On top of the devastating impact of the pig eradication program and the coup d'etat, such policies leave Haitian farmers in a much weaker position to increase their own production of food crops.

Competing Visions

USAID's Perspective on Development and Food Security

USAID has followed a consistent strategy in Haiti designed to move peasant farmers out of food production. In its 1991 "Development Strategy Statement for Haiti," prepared in the hopeful, heady period following the landslide election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, USAID laments, "Policy-induced distortions have encouraged the production of annual food crops for domestic consumption. This pattern, together with insecure land tenure, has promoted negligent land use and aggravated erosion of the topsoil."[45]

USAID suggests that Haiti "diversify" and "modernize" its agricultural sector, ori-

U.S. Aid to Haiti Since Aristide's Return: Commitments and Disbursements by Sector, $000

	PROJECTED		ACTUAL	PROJECTED	
	Total	%	FY95 & 96	FY97	FY98+
Balance of Payments	92.80	21.0	92.80	0.00	0.00
Humanitarian Assistance	57.50	13.0	52.50	5.00	0.00
Governance	148.80	33.6	107.75	20.72	20.33
Agriculture	18.89	4.3	16.69	1.40	.80
Environment	18.06	4.1	3.76	7.30	7.00
Health	81.57	18.4	52.23	14.67	14.67
Education	13.37	3.0	10.43	1.47	1.47
Private Sector Development	9.80	2.2	6.80	1.50	1.50
Other	1.98	0.4	1.28	0.35	0.35
Totals	**442.77**	**100.00**	**344.24**	**52.41**	**46.12**

SOURCE: Figures compiled from World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Commitment/Disbursement Estimates as of October 10, 1995," informal working document based on data submitted by donors, 1995; and World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Pipeline and Disbursements, November 12, 1996" (Washington: 1996).

USAID's commitments for Haiti programs for FY95 through FY98 show misplaced priorities. The largest chunk of aid goes for governance (33.6%), with police training making up almost half the funds in this category. Another 21% goes for balance of payments support and the clearance of arrears on Haiti's balance of payments (21.0%). Neither has a large trickle-down effect for Haiti's poor, since balance of payments support is essentially used by the Haitian government to pay salaries (many for foreign consultants) and to finance a growing import bill, and arrears clearance is mirage money which never really arrives in Haiti at all.

Health and humanitarian assistance follow with 18.4% and 13.0% respectively. Within the category of humanitarian assistance, the great majority of funds went to controversial food-aid and jobs-creation programs, said by donors to be key to enhancing food security yet heavily criticized by Haitian agronomists, economists, and peasants.

In contrast to the funds devoted to other purposes, the agricultural sector, crucial to Haitians' hopes of future food security, receives a mere $19 million, 4.3% of the projected total.

enting it toward export crops such as coffee and mangos. In the eyes of USAID, "Peasant agriculture does not present a viable developmental, or even survival, alternative for Haitians entering the labor market. The available land in Haiti cannot support even the current population using prevailing production practices. There is an urgent need to orient as much of the rural population as possible to more remunerative opportunities." [46]

This is consistent with USAID's overall vision of development based on "comparative advantage," in which each nation produces only those things that it can produce more cheaply than other nations. Countries should obtain the rest of their needs through "free" trade. USAID's strategy statement identifies Haiti's advantages as being "a resourceful, energetic private sector; a large, hardworking, and inexpensive labor force; and climatic conditions which offer agro-industrial and tourism opportunities in the vast nearby North American market."[47]

"There can be no food security in Haiti if there is not an increase in food production."

Although Haiti is an agrarian nation where 65% of the population depends on the agricultural sector for its livelihood,[48] USAID believes that a food security strategy for Haiti should not strive for "food self-sufficiency." Rather than tackling the obstacles to domestic food production, USAID argues that Haiti should prioritize labor-intensive production of exports. The 1991 strategy statement asserts that this will increase both individual and national purchasing power and allow the purchase of imported food,[49] largely produced by subsidized U.S. farmers.

The reforms that USAID is pursuing for the 1990s are: "macro-economic stabilization policy"; "trade liberalization" (including the reduction of import tariffs on food); "reform or privatization of state enterprises"; "promotion of sound agricultural policies that redress the current distortions in favor of import-substituting crops and against more efficient export production"; and "land use and land tenure reform."[50]

All U.S. government aid to Haiti is designed to promote this comparative-advantage-based, export-led scheme of development. The strategy statement notes that U.S. government aid "assures us a seat at the policy dialogue table." It says that the USAID mission in Haiti "will target several priority policy reform areas, often serving as a catalyst, encouraging and facilitating [the Haitian government's] acceptance of, and compliance with, [international financial institutions'] conditionality."[51]

Haiti's Perspective on Development and Food Security

"One of the first places that a country which wants to be sovereign should invest in is agriculture. A country which can't feed its people is condemned to be the servant of others."

—Ansi VixImar, Coordinator, national Tèt Kole peasant movement[52]

The prescription of USAID—that Haiti base its development and food security strategy on exports and use the resulting income to purchase an imported food supply—is widely rejected in Haiti. Instead, Haitians' top goals are to increase national production, especially agricultural production, and to prioritize domestic needs rather than filling a niche in a global export system.

Throughout Haiti, economists, agronomists, government officials, and peasant farmers assert that Haiti can and should produce more of its own food. They argue that giving priority to agricultural production

will have many social and economic benefits, including enhanced food security.

"There can be no food security in Haiti if there is not an increase in food production," explains Gilles Damais of CNSA, the government body responsible for drafting policies for food security strategy for Haiti. "In the short and medium terms, the first objective should be an increase in food production, because the majority of Haiti's population is peasants in rural areas who rely on agricultural, and particularly, food production. If we can help this sector improve ... we have a double effect on food security. First of all, we increase the availability of foodstuffs, and secondly we improve the revenues of the peasants, who can then use this to improve the food security of their households."[53]

The National Association of Haitian Agro-Professionals (ANDAH) has pointed out that reinvigorating Haiti's economy through a strong agricultural base will slow the exodus from the countryside[54]—an exodus that has filled the slums of Port-au-Prince and threatens to renew an outflow of economic refugees abroad.

Increasing domestic food production would reduce imports, thereby easing Haiti's balance of trade and lowering inflation. Haiti now spends US$ 100 million annually on rice imports alone, which in 1995 accounted for 15% of total imports.[55] However, Senator Samuel Madistin of the Artibonite Department says his region used to have 28,000 hectares of irrigated, rice-producing land, but that capacity has been reduced, in the dry season, to 10,000 hectares. With policies designed to put land back into production, there could be at least 40,000 hectares of land producing rice in the Artibonite alone.[56] Such examples abound and are regularly cited as proof by the people Grassroots International interviewed that Haiti can produce more food.

Many Haitians describe their current dependence on food imports as being "held by the stomach." They are loathe to tie their economic future to filling an export niche dependent on the vagaries of international markets, tastes, and politics. "At the same time they tell you that there should be a free market, they protect theirs, and they have a large capacity to do so," observes Haiti's former Agricultural Minister David Nicola. [57] The CNSA's Gilles Damais agrees, warning that "It is one thing to encourage diversification but it is very, very dangerous for Haitian peasants to specialize in production for export."[58]

With policies designed to put land back into production, there could be at least 40,000 hectares of land producing rice in the Artibonite alone.

One of USAID's primary arguments for seeking food security through revenue enhancements (including the promotion of exports) rather than food production is that even most farmers are net food purchasers in Haiti: they spend more income on food purchases than they gain in agricultural sales. [59] Yet, this net imbalance is not an accurate reflection of the potential productivity of the agricultural sector. It is, in fact, largely due to factors which could be easily modified.

The first is the scarcity of affordable credit for peasant farmers and their resulting victimization by rural loan sharks offering what is commonly referred to as a "*kout ponya*," or "dagger stab." According to recent national surveys by the National Peasant Movement of the Papaye Congress (MPNKP), the largest national peasant movement in Haiti, while *kout ponya* interest



rates begin at 20% per month, the most common rate is 25% a month. Rates go as high as 50% a month, or 600% per year.[60]

In attempting to repay such loans as quickly as possible, peasants often sell their crops in advance of harvest for a pittance, a practice known as selling crops "in bloom." According to the MPNKP, plantains that would fetch 75 gourdes after harvest sell for as little as 7 gourdes "in bloom."[61]

Another factor is a lack of local storage facilities, which renders peasants unable to release their harvest onto the market gradually and negotiate higher prices as the post-harvest season lengthens. This leads peasants to sell their entire harvest at low, harvest-time prices and means that they must later repurchase it—for household consumption or seed—at much higher prices.[62]

Strong support for affordable credit and storage schemes would greatly reduce the number of net food purchasers by providing peasants with a larger portion of the selling price. They could then reinvest in production and household food consumption.

Unfortunately, these relatively low-cost measures have not been USAID's priority in Haiti. Instead, food-aid and short-term jobs-creation projects dominated the agency's food-security programs in the first two years following President Aristide's return to Haiti. As the following chapters document, those programs have in many ways undermined the food security of rural Haitians.

Feeding Dependency: U.S. Food Aid in Haiti

"Food aid has never truly helped those who are hungry. . . . The National Peasant Movement of the Papaye Congress will continue to struggle against the food aid program in this country. If a country wishes to give us 'aid,' they should help us produce our own food."

—statement by Haiti's largest peasant association[1]

"Are we going to demoralize people and take away their dignity by handing out food which is all prepared for them? . . . There is a mess in the way food aid is distributed."

—David Nicola, Agricultural Minister under the Aristide/Werleigh government[2]

"What is happening in the Northwest . . . is disastrous. The more food aid they receive, the more dependent they become, and the more degraded the area becomes, because they spend all their time waiting for food aid."

—Samuel Madistin, Artibonite Senator[3]

"[Food aid] is like taking a sick person and giving them serum from time to time just so they don't die."

— Stephen Phelps, agronomist with the National Association of Haitian Agro-Professionals (ANDAH)[4]

"Food assistance activities have been measured largely on the amount of food distributed rather than on nutritional impact or any other kind of impact, to be perfectly honest with you."

—Phil Gelman, manager, food-assisted development, CARE/HAITI[5]

History and Current Practices

U.S. food aid first came to Haiti in 1954 as a response to Hurricane Hazel. Even after that crisis was mitigated, food deliveries continued and became the centerpiece of USAID's food security programs in Haiti. Not surprisingly (given the predominant role of the U.S. in international dealings with Haiti), the U.S. has traditionally been the biggest donor of food aid to Haiti, providing an estimated 85% of the total.[6] The aid is provided under the "Food for Peace Program" established in 1954 with Public

Law 480 (PL 480), whereby the U.S. Department of Agriculture purchases agricultural commodities from U.S. farmers and allocates them for sale or donation abroad. There are two basic types of U.S. food aid:

- Food aid provided under PL 480 Title I (later replaced by Title III) is also referred to as direct aid, because the commodities —mostly wheat and semi-refined vegetable oil—are delivered directly to the Haitian government, which then "monetizes" them, or sells them to private businesses. The "counterpart funds" that come from monetization are put into a special Haitian government account. These funds are supposed to be used to support development programs; only programs approved by the U.S. government may be funded. Until recently, this direct "aid" was not donated, but rather sold to the Haitian government via concessional loans. After 1991, the concessional loan programs were converted into grant programs.[7]

- Food aid provided under PL 480 Title II is also referred to as indirect aid, because commodities are given to U.S. NGOs to distribute to food-deficit populations in Haiti. This aid is either given free of charge to beneficiaries or monetized. The funds from monetization are supposed to be used to finance development projects.

Even while all direct U.S. aid to Haiti was suspended from 1963 to 1973 due to the human rights record of dictator François Duvalier, U.S. NGOs continued to deliver large quantities of food aid under a humanitarian exemption. When the U.S. government resumed aid to Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier's administration, food aid further increased. From 1975-76 to 1985-86, international food aid to Haiti quadrupled, much of it coming from the United States.[8] In 1975, a PL 480 Title I agreement tripled the amount of wheat entering the country. A decade later, the first PL 480 Title III accord between the U.S. and Haiti further doubled the inflow of wheat and tripled that of vegetable oil.[9] Food aid was also pumped in via Title II programs, with the volume of food distributed by U.S. NGOs increasing by 300% from 1973 to 1987.[10]

While the 1991 coup that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide once again led to a cutoff in direct aid, indirect food aid continued on humanitarian grounds. A USAID document recounts that, in 1992, "when the Mission began to realize that political resolution would not be quick, *that the embargo would not be strict*"[11] (emphasis added), it began to plan for a longer program.

The resulting Enhancing Food Security program (EFS I), which ran from October 1992 to September 1995, dramatically increased indirect food aid deliveries to Haiti. As shown in the following table, over 378,000 metric tons of food aid valued at roughly US$ 169 million were delivered to Haiti between 1993 and 1995, with U.S. aid accounting for 68% of the total flow (volume and value). By September 1995, U.S. food aid was said to reach over one million Haitians per day.[12]

Approximately US$ 100 million in U.S. taxpayer money was spent on food aid under the EFS I program, including the value of the food commodities themselves.[13]

From 1954 to 1995, millions of metric tons of food aid were distributed in Haiti at the cost of billions of taxpayer dollars on the pretext of increasing food security. What has been the real impact of this aid?

Summary Research Findings

In addition to conducting extensive bibliographic research and consulting numerous USAID studies and publications, Grassroots International interviewed dozens of economists, agronomists, food security experts, government officials, aid workers, peasant farmers, and food aid recipients. Grassroots International's research revealed the following troubling aspects of U.S. food aid programs in Haiti:

1. U.S. food aid to Haiti furthers U.S. economic interests, not Haitian development.

Analysts of international food aid such as the Institute for Food and Development Policy (Food First) and others have long documented the political and economic forces driving the allocation of such aid.[15] Haiti is no exception. Jean-Pierre Roca, a geographer with the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France, has studied and written extensively about food security issues in Haiti. He argues that food aid programs in Haiti cannot be seen as a proportional response to an increasing food deficit, nor are they simply motivated by an attempt to improve the nutritional status of the population. Rather, they "are also due, as elsewhere, to political and economic considerations."[16]

The manager of CARE's food-assisted development division in Haiti, would seem to agree. He told Grassroots International, "Part of the problem is that Haiti is, you know, not a foreign policy question. It's a domestic policy question for the United States. Things are substantially political." He recounted that "When the last set of sanctions was ratcheted up in early '95, President Clinton said, 'OK, we are going to go from one million to 1.3 million people in our humanitarian programs [in Haiti].' Where did the White House get 1.3 million? None of us sitting here knows. None of the people sitting in AID know. It was what needed to

Food Aid: Allocation by Volume and Value, 1993 to 1995[14]

	1993 volume (MT)	1993 value ($1,000)	1994 volume (MT)	1994 value ($1,000)	1995 volume (MT)	1995 value ($,1000)
USAID Title II	26,932	12,701	56,300	22,523	76,124	30,224
USAID Title III	49,107	19,828	35,190	13,383	4,705	10,000
(USAID total	76,039	32,529	91,490	35,906	100,829	40,224)
EC	12,202	10,127	27,395	10,638	14,510	6,415
WFP	6,656	3,723	17,166	4,111	1,739	1,459
France	6,000	3,800	6,000	4,360	5,500	3,900
Canada	3,450	3,300	3,240	3,900	5,838	4,200
Total	**104,347**	**53,479**	**145,291**	**58,915**	**128,416**	**56,198**



be said for [whomever] it needed to be consumed by."[17]

Our research found the following economic objectives behind U.S. food aid programs in Haiti:

Food aid is used by the U.S. government to entice and/or pressure the government of Haiti to adopt neoliberal, export-oriented economic policies—policies detrimental to food security in Haiti.

As Josh DeWind and David Kinley document in their seminal book, *AIDing Migration*, flooding Haiti with food aid has, since 1982, been a critical element in USAID's overall "export-oriented" development strategy: "Food aid is being used not only to facilitate governmental policy reforms needed to shift Haiti's agricultural sector to export crop production, but also to provide food for consumption as Haiti produces less and less of its own food."[18]

It is clear when one looks at countries receiving large quantities of PL480 food aid that they become dependent on and therefore purchasers of U.S. cereals.

USAID documents are replete with references to direct aid—in particular, balance of payments support and Titles I and III food aid—as policy leverage.[19] The texts of Titles I and III accords are essentially contracts, whereby the U.S. government agrees to supply a certain amount of food commodities in exchange for the implementation of clearly defined, U.S.-favored policies by the government of Haiti. Haitian economist Camille Chalmers notes that the precondition for PL 480 Title I aid after the outbreak of African Swine Fever in the early 1980s was the complete eradication of Haiti's Creole pig population. This eradication included a quarantined healthy herd which Chalmers and others were attempting to save for repopulation purposes. The subsequent elimination of the pigs is cited as one of the watershed events in Haiti's downward economic spiral.[20]

The PL 480 Title III program initiated in 1985 made the release of counterpart funds from wheat sales contingent upon the use of two-thirds of them to institute structural economic reforms consistent with USAID's export-oriented vision of development and food security. Among the demanded reforms were the lowering of export taxes on coffee and the lowering of tariffs on key imported food items. To sweeten the deal, the U.S. promised to convert Title III concessional sales into outright grants once the reforms were instituted, which it did.[21] Recent PL 480 Title III accords clearly state that this aid is conditioned upon the continued reduction of import tariffs.[22]

Food aid is used to help open new markets for U.S. production by altering traditional patterns of consumption and thereby fueling demand in Haiti for imported commodities.

It is clear when one looks at countries receiving large quantities of PL480 food aid that they become dependent on, and therefore purchasers of, U.S. cereals.[23] USAID has used this argument before the U.S. Congress in an attempt to defend itself from budget cuts. NGOs in the food aid industry also push this as an argument to keep funds pouring in. For example, CARE's annual report in 1995, celebrating its fiftieth anniversary lists "investment" as one of its "50 reasons to believe in the next 50 years" because "countries that were once recipients of humanitarian aid today purchase 31% of U.S. agricultural exports."[24]

A resident of Gonaïves gave Grassroots International a concrete example of this process: "They used to give out pinto beans. Lots of them. Folks began to develop a taste for them [and] pinto beans began appearing in the marketplace, cheaper than other local varieties. People were buying and eating those pinto beans like crazy. Then, bit by bit, the price started to increase as the market stabilized. Now, they don't give them out anymore, so they cost a lot more than domestic varieties, but people still favor them. It's like a low intensity conflict is being waged on all levels."[25]

2. Food aid drives down cereal prices, thus discouraging Haitian peasants from producing food crops for local consumption and shifting them instead to export crops.

There is consensus among food security analysts that the price of wheat dictates the structure of cereal prices in Haiti.[26] Thus, the deliveries of massive quantities of PL 480 Title III wheat have acted to lower the price of local grains. DeWind and Kinley explain that "[US]AID's strategy for getting Haiti's peasants to abandon food crop production in favor of export crop production is to reduce the prices paid for food in local markets, while increasing the prices that producers receive for export crops. . . . One of the major purposes of the Title III food aid program is to lower the high prices of maize and other food crops that have attracted Haitian peasants away from producing coffee."[27]

Consultant Gérard Gagnon argues in a 1996 World Bank commissioned study that, from a macro point of view, food aid does not compete with production—the position held by USAID. He adds, however, that competition on local markets cannot be ruled out. He notes that food deliveries could lower prices in small, regional markets, and that any deliveries arriving after local harvests would penalize farmers at the moment they need to sell. He also notes that over 70% of food aid is not monetized. Instead, it is given out for free and often resold at below-market prices. This can lower prices on local markets and compete unfairly with local production.[28]

An unpublished 1993 study conducted by Cécile Berut for the French NGO International Action Against Hunger (AICF) concluded that international food aid was more likely to be distributed in more accessible areas and thereby more likely to compete with domestically produced food.[29]

Food security analyst Gilles Damais, who works with Haiti's National Coordination for Food Security (CNSA), argues that Title II food deliveries, because they "always end up on the market," do affect food prices and thus producer incomes. "CARE is very problematic in this sense, because their operations are on a large scale, they distribute a lot of food, and without any means to control its final use." He reports visiting "an irrigated area with a great deal of agricultural production" in December 1995 and finding a CARE representative distributing sacks of food. Asked if there had been an attempt to raise the issue with CARE, he replied, "I think they are very aware of the problem, but CARE lives off the distribution of food aid."[30]

3. Food aid fosters a cycle of increased dependency and reduced initiative.

Government officials, economists, agronomists, peasant leaders, and even USAID analysts repeatedly noted that the high volume of food aid distributed in Haiti over such a long period of time has led both

the Haitian government and recipient communities to become dependent and less motivated to search for lasting solutions to the food deficit.

Ansi Viximar, a coordinator of the national Tèt Kole peasant movement, observed that "Food aid puts people into a waiting mode, whereby they don't make the same efforts they used to. Sometimes, when the rains fall and they would normally be working in the fields, they have the tendency to wait for food to be given them."[31]

"What is the people's real problem? Why is it that you are giving them a plate of food?" asked Artibonite Senator Samuel Madistin rhetorically. "What they really need is help to make the land produce more food. . . . Instead of spending two or three years teaching people to fish, [these NGOs] prefer to give them a fish every day. And as they are giving out fish, the people who are working to produce. . . come to the conclusion that it is better to go get a plate of food, a fish, instead of going out to fish themselves. This is how they create more dependency."[32]

4. Food aid programs have been carried out largely without coordination. They are poorly targeted and do not enter into any national strategy of development.

Foreign NGOs distribute massive amounts of food aid in Haiti, a total of 100,000 metric tons per year.[33] Pierre Jean Roca stresses that, until very recently, this voluminous aid suffered from a complete absence of coordination, planning, and analysis and evaluation of impact. As mentioned above, Cécile Berut's 1993 study of food aid found that indirect aid tended to be delivered to areas where access was easy as opposed to where the need was greatest. Furthermore, ANDAH agronomist Stephen Phelps argues that clientelism is often a determining factor in where food is delivered.[34] All of this not only means that aid is poorly targeted, but also that any resulting funds from monetization are less effectively used to support development. A majority of recent counterpart funds from Title III wheat sales have funded labor-intensive, jobs-creation programs whose impact on agricultural production is largely negative.[35]

5. Delivery of food aid has become a business, leading U.S. NGOs to become more beholden to U.S. foreign policy than they are to the supposed beneficiaries of their projects.

The distressing reality is that food aid distribution has become a business in Haiti. Many people—both Haitian and foreign workers—depend upon it for their livelihood. In the eyes of a peasant from the northwestern town of La Coma, "All the intellectuals, agronomists, university-types that come through here. . . our misery is a source to keep them and all the NGOs going. They don't really want to see us get ahead."[36] This peasant woman could likely not even begin to conceptualize the size of the annual compensation of CARE CEO Philip Johnston, which in 1994 was $278,749.[37]

Whose interests do U.S. NGOs delivering food in Haiti truly serve? CARE's largest budgetary sponsor by far is the U.S. government. CARE received over 60% of its revenue for the fiscal years 1993 and 1994 from U.S. government grants, contracts, and in-kind aid, including food aid. For Catholic Relief Services, another major provider of food aid in Haiti, the figures are 76% and 74%, respectively; for the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, the figures are 75% and 81%, respectively.[38]

How free are these NGOs to set their programs independent of U.S. policy interests and to critique the direction of USAID food security strategy? Said one CARE official, "We all know the gig in Haiti, on a certain level. The Haitians know it. There's gamesmanship all over the place. You know what you can push for and what you can't. . . . No one is naive and we know that the world is a political world. Decisions are going to be made based on those kinds of interests and that is what it is. But at least we know in an objective sense where we ought to be focusing."[39]

Thus, while national food production is identified by most Haitian analysts—and by the current Haitian government—as the key element in resolving the nation's food security crisis, the reality is that the driving force behind food aid, its method of delivery, and its accompanying conditionalities make it harder for Haitians to produce their own food. Yet, for decades the Haitian government has sought food aid and allowed for its almost-unfettered distribution while ceding to the conditionalities imposed by donors. This stopgap means of attempting both to close the food deficit and to find means of budgetary support (in the case of direct, monetized aid) comes with a very high price tag indeed. It poses serious obstacles to the long-term resolution of Haiti's food security crisis.

Case Study Findings: CARE's Food Aid Program in Haiti's Northwest

Of the U.S. NGOs delivering Title II food assistance in Haiti, the biggest operator by far is CARE. CARE has been present in Haiti since 1954, primarily in the Northwest, but also in the North (earlier on) and in the Southern Peninsula (more recently). Haiti is one of CARE's largest missions, ranking sixth overall for FY 1994 and fourth for FY 1997.[40] Phil Gelman, manager of food-assisted development for CARE/Haiti, estimated that the total budget for all activities for CARE/Haiti for operations, donated food, and food transport in FY 1996 was US$ 31-37 million (down from during the coup period).[41]

CARE's work in Haiti prior to the 1991 coup was based largely on school feeding and food-for-work infrastructure programs, with some maternal child health activities. At the height of the coup, CARE was providing one meal each day to 620,000 persons, two-thirds of them via *cantines populaires* (soup kitchens) and most of the remainder in school feeding programs. Gelman says CARE is currently "in transition, away from food as an end to food as a means for development." He hopes the new program will be "a more substantial answer to food security issues than straight food distribution."[42]

How free are these NGOs to set their programs independent of U.S. policy interests and to critique the direction of USAID food security strategy?

Certainly, changes would be welcome. Although CARE has 40 years of experience in Haiti, Grassroots International's research with dozens of CARE workers and volunteers, peasant farmers, and community residents throughout Haiti's northern Artibonite and Northwest found the following troubling critiques:

1. CARE's food aid activities have not encouraged productivity but rather have generated dependency and discouraged individual initiative.

Throughout the Northwest, people told Grassroots International that food aid "puts people to sleep," "is just there to calm the people down," "discourages people rather than encouraging them," and "makes people less inclined to work the land." Residents of the town of Ti Karinaj reported that in the 1960s and 1970s, CARE supported artisan projects in the area, but that since the 1980s, "it was food aid, all the way. For the amount of food they gave to us. . . if they had put it into other projects, things wouldn't be like this today."[43] Agronomists have cited fishing and salt production as potential remunerative activities for the area, yet CARE had no such programs in the area,[44] and people have become dependent on food handouts.

"The canteens may have saved the lives of some, but they also destroyed the resistance of many."

During the coup, there were food canteens in "just about every backyard," each feeding hundreds of people. They were shut down in 1995, leaving only more scattered dry distribution posts for non-perishable goods. "CARE sends us a little food, a little food, and now they leave and pull out the rug from underneath us," complained one man.[45]

All of the community leaders we spoke with would prefer to see CARE support agricultural production rather than hand out food aid. "These lands can produce," said Robert Métayer, a Tèt Kole organizer from Raymond. "You have to help the peasants get what they need to work so that they can make the land produce and support their families. Animal husbandry is also important, and harnessing the water of Trois Rivières for irrigation."[46]

Said one woman from a peasant group in La Coma, "Even if things are difficult for us, we are struggling hard to produce our own food, because we don't support CARE's system. Besides, if they had come here to really do something, they would have done it long ago."[47]

Maurepas Faustène is a volunteer tree nursery technician working with the government's District Agricultural Bureau in the town of Bombardopolis which, although located in Haiti's arid Far West, is somewhat of an oasis. "Lots of people were complaining about food aid," he reported. "The canteens may have saved the lives of some, but they also destroyed the resistance of many. People would lose whole days worth of work, waiting for feeding time to roll around so that they wouldn't be left out. . . . Now, any old jobs project that comes through, people want to work on it because they are out of the habit of working in the fields. . . . For the millions distributed in this area, what has been the result? People just keep getting poorer. Why don't they do anything to try to capture water sources?"[48]

2. CARE's food aid activities generated corruption and clientelism and reinforced skewed power relations in communities.

Grassroots International consistently heard stories of corruption and power-brokering fueled by food aid programs. National Tèt Kole leader Ansi Viximar told us that "A small group of people, often linked with the government or the Tontons Macoutes. . . are always the ones who have the privilege of having a canteen, or have a monopoly on the distribution of food aid . . . . At the same time this brings division and destroys solidarity among the people, it makes a tiny group of people rich on the backs of the population."[49]

In Bombardopolis, Maurepas Faustène reported that "Those in charge of the can-

teens sold the food, or just didn't distribute it." He and other peasant leaders said that to get a ration card for dry distributions, "you have to have a connection."[50] This comment was heard repeatedly throughout the Northwest. Anger against this corruption was so strong in Raymond that some of CARE's canteens and food deliveries were ransacked. "It's true that people here are in a difficult situation," said Tèt Kole's Métayer, "but the way they distribute the food is a problem. That's why people here rose up against the canteens. . . . It was only benefiting. . . those with canteens at their houses. There were canteens that went days or even weeks without cooking food." He reported that six of the nine canteens in the immediate area were especially notorious for selling the donated food, and the remaining three were only slightly less corrupt.[51]

CARE's Phil Gelman agreed that the canteens had caused destabilizing relations in rural communities and said this was why they were discontinued in October 1995. "We would have liked to phase [them] out earlier and replace them with dry distribution," he said, "but because of the tremendous social unrest we were reluctant, as was [US]AID, to make any change to upset the apple cart at all."[52]

3. CARE's food aid activities led to the widespread sale of food aid on local markets, thus competing with locally produced cereals.

The large quantities of food aid that are sent to Haiti play havoc with local markets. Food aid products are readily available for sale in market places throughout the Northwest. A visit to the market place in Mare Rouge found food aid undercutting the price of local grains. Whereas local black beans were 46 gourdes per mamit,[53] the green peas sent by CARE were sold for 24 gourdes. Local sorghum sold for 20 gourdes per mamit, local corn meal for 14 gourdes, and CARE bulghar wheat for 13 gourdes. Only the vegetable oil sent by CARE was more expensive than the commercially imported variety, with the former selling for 17.5 gourdes per liter and the latter for 16.5 gourdes.[54] (Haiti no longer produces edible oils.)

In Cabaret, where people plant sorghum, corn, and several varieties of beans, market women said that the already low price of bulghar would be dropping for the next few days because of the food aid distribution happening in a nearby building. They predicted that the bulghar that normally sells at 14 or 15 gourdes per mamit would sell for 10 to 13 gourdes. They indicated that the price of Miami rice (normally 33-34 gourdes per mamit) and local corn would also drop. Local black and white beans, which sell at 48 and 45 gourdes per mamit respectively, were not expected to be affected because CARE had not delivered green peas.[55]

4. CARE's activities were conducted in the absence of dialogue with distribution volunteers, community leaders, and residents.

Throughout the Northwest, and in the Artibonite as well, the "beneficiaries" of CARE programs consistently reported that they were not consulted in the planning or design of programs and that they resented this marginalization. "It's a difficult area here," said one of the peasants in La Coma, "so you can't simply say that food aid isn't good. It's the way that it's done that is the problem. They just appear, *voop*, and there are no discussions at all with the people who have been organizing here. It's a lack of respect."[56]

The peasants in La Coma contrasted CARE's approach with that of the European NGO supporting their tree nursery. The agency's representatives had sat down to analyze and plan with them, as well as carry out training. In Bombardopolis, Faustène complained that "CARE never sits down to discuss anything with us. If they write that in their project papers when they are asking for millions, it's just on paper." Several peasant leaders present concurred.[57]

In Ti Karinaj, former canteen managers and beneficiaries reported that CARE never told them why they were shut down. The whole process by which foreign NGOs operate had caused great resentment in the community. Said one man, "You always see these foreign experts coming through, in fancy jeeps. If they are going to do something here, you know that they are going to be deciding everything. We don't get a chance to participate at all." The crowd gathered indicated that they are afraid to present criticisms of CARE's programs to the representatives who pass through because they are afraid of losing what aid they have and never receiving more.[58]

While food aid may be justified in emergency situations, it must be administered in such a way that it does not erode local food production, dampen initiative, or undermine community organizations. Grassroots International found these flaws in CARE's food-aid programs in the Northwest.

Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Labor-intensive, Jobs-Creation Programs in Haiti

"It was absolutely necessary, while the Americans were in Haiti, that there be a truly 'secure and stable' climate. These [jobs] programs offered more fluff than real social and political security. They were designed to keep the population calm, so they wouldn't rise up, wouldn't go on strike, wouldn't create social tension, so that everything would go smoothly so they could say that Clinton succeeded 100%. . . . But this is not at all aid which can develop this country, which goes toward reinforcing its productive capacity or other serious things. . . . It is political."

—Camille Chalmers, Director, Haitian Platform for Alternative Development (PAPDA)[1]

"These [labor-intensive] projects are only conceived as a way to give peasants money and often. . . it's during the period when peasants would be working in the fields, planting, that they offer these jobs. So, all the peasants leave their fields. They come to have money in their hands to buy things. What will they be buying? Miami rice, pinto beans – imported items and food aid. . . . There's no harvest, they've got money, food is imported or donated, and they buy it. This is the logic."

—Stephen Phelps, National Association of Haitian Agro-Professionals[2]

"If you want food security. . . [the route to take] is not labor-intensive projects. . . . They are nothing more than endlessly running around in circles. . . . Okay, people are hungry, and I'm not against giving them jobs. . . but labor-intensive projects can't substitute for a general action plan to reinvigorate national production."

—Haitian government inspector of jobs-creation projects[3]

Background on Recent Jobs-Creation Programs

In preparation for former President Aristide's projected October 1993 return to Haiti under the Governor's Island Accord, USAID authorized a grant of US$ 18 million to fund its massive JOBS Initiative, which originally was to be augmented by US$ 14.5 million in matching funding from the Haitian government.[4] Its stated purpose was "to quickly provide short term employment. . . during the period leading up to and immediately following a satisfactory political resolution to Haiti's current political crisis. Labor-intensive activities will increase the income of many poor Haitian families and strengthen their capabilities to meet their basic nutritional

requirements. The 14-month employment program is intended to create a sense of confidence and hope that the restored democratic government is working for the people and can create tangible benefits to the quality of life. Concurrently, the program will bring improvements to the country's deteriorated productive infrastructure."[5]

Activities began in September 1993, with a September 30 status review reporting that the program "will stop if the constitutional government in place is suspended."[6] Yet even after repression reached new heights—forcing the shadow constitutional government into hiding, assassinating its justice minister, and shattering the hope for Aristide's 1993 return—activities under the JOBS Initiative continued and were then extended. It became a 34-month, US$ 38 million program, running for 13 months under the coup regime and another 21 months after Aristide's return.[7]

Project reports and evaluations prepared by PADF and USAID provide glowing assessments of the program. Yet Grassroots International found a very different sentiment among the programs' supposed "beneficiaries."

As is typical for USAID programs, the funds were channeled through U.S. NGOs. In this case, the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) was guaranteed most of the contract.[8] PADF then subcontracted with other "implementing organizations" to carry out 120 individual labor-intensive projects in irrigation rehabilitation, soil conservation, road repair, and urban sanitation.

At its peak in July 1995, the program was said to be employing over 50,000 people per day. PADF reported to USAID that 427,000 persons were employed during the program and that, taking family members of workers into account, 35% of the country's population benefited from the program.[9] A final project evaluation boasted that the PADF-JOBS portion of the JOBS Initiative alone brought 48,000 hectares of land under full irrigation; rehabilitated 1,600 km of roads; protected 12,500 hectares of land with soil conservation structures; added the potential for the production of nearly 110,000 additional metric tons of food per year; and bolstered confidence in Haiti's democratic system.[10]

In July 1995, the World Bank agreed to lend the Haitian government US$ 50 million for a follow-on jobs-creation program modeled after the USAID JOBS Initiative. This second program, known by its French acronym PCE (Projet de Création d'Emplois), was designed to provide 480,000 person-months of work and was originally slated to run until September 1996 but was extended to December 1996.[11] One of the stipulations for the loan was that the funds be channeled through a controversial entity known as the UCG, or Central Implementation Unit. Referred to by many Haitians as "a state within the state," the UCG was created at the behest of the international community to bypass Haitian government ministries considered too slow and bureaucratic.[12]

Another precondition for the loan was that US$ 31 million be set aside for PADF, the only organization authorized by the international community to supervise PCE projects. According to PCE director Frantz Nelson, the Haitian government protested. Although he subsequently attempted to have Haitian organizations authorized, the only other supervisors eventually accepted by the Bank were foreign NGOs, with PADF still retaining the vast majority of the contracts.[13] Although not



accepting the term "preconditions," Lee Nelson, former USAID project officer for the JOBS Initiative and current assistant director of PADF's jobs-creation division, felt it only natural that PADF received the major funding because it is "a well-established, international PVO [private voluntary organization] which has been working in Haiti for 13 years and has lots of contacts with local PVOs."[14] As discussed below, the nature of those PVOs raised considerable controversy within Haiti's democratic sector.

It is clear that these jobs-creation programs had a major impact on Haiti both during and after the coup, but what was the nature of that impact? Project reports and evaluations prepared by PADF and USAID provide glowing assessments of the program.[15] Yet field research and interviews that Grassroots International conducted with dozens of government officials, economists, agronomists, peasant associations, and community residents found a very different sentiment among the programs' supposed "beneficiaries." We found several troubling aspects regarding the motivation for, the functioning of, and the impact of these programs.

Summary Research Findings

1. Jobs-creation programs actively strengthened anti-democratic forces and weakened grassroots, democratic organizations.

USAID and PADF project documents openly state an underlying political motivation for the jobs-creation programs: the need "to reduce post-embargo social disturbances" and "bolster faith in the democratic process."[16] PADF representatives also have publicly acknowledged that the programs were used in an attempt to stem the flow of "boat-people" fleeing Haiti for Florida and to entice Guantanamo refugees back to Haiti—both major objectives of U.S. foreign policy at the time. PADF agronomist Joseph Felix observed that the objective of soil conservation work in Léogânne was not only to control the Rouyonne River, but also to stabilize the population, since many area residents were leaving on boats.[17] Furthermore, PADF's final report states, "at the request of USAID," PADF staff visited Guantanamo twice "to encourage the refugees to return with offers of employment under the project."[18]

However, the U.S. was essentially carrying out a public works program under the military dictatorship. This had serious detrimental consequences for development and democracy. For more than a year, the program operated in a climate of intense political repression, when the majority of authentic community leaders were in various degrees of hiding.[19] In the course of our research, elected officials and peasant leaders named several organizations that USAID and PADF chose to work with that had close ties to the coup regime.

The first project approved under the Initiative was carried out by the Center for Development and Health (CDS) in the pro-Aristide slums of Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince. CDS, long a major recipient of USAID funding, has been cited by many Cité Soleil residents and international investigative journalists as having assassins from the paramilitary group FRAPH on its payroll.[20] CDS implemented seven of the 120 projects and was thus empowered to award jobs to over 17,000 Cité Soleil residents and another 5,000 in their northeastern base of

Ouanaminthe.[21] The second subcontract was awarded to CARE, which—often working in conjunction with local partners cited as linked with the coup regime (see case studies below)—implemented six projects and was able to offer jobs to a whopping 50,626 workers, the largest for the program.[22] Other PADF partners included several conservative Protestant missionary operations, including the staunchly right-wing Baptist Mission run by Pastor Wallace Turnbull. Even after the departure of the coup leaders, PADF continued to propose many of the same discredited partner organizations.[23]

The negative implications that this carries for sustainable, community-based development cannot be overemphasized. By conducting the program under the coup regime, the U.S. was providing the illegal government with political support. The fact that NGOs worked with tainted local partners to hand out jobs and associated benefits gave massive economic—and therefore political and social—power to these anti-democratic forces. As Deputy Ronald Deshommes, representing Grand Saline in Parliament, explained, "When these organizations come in, all the peasant organizations in the area are destroyed, because community projects should be done in conjunction with existing organized structures. Yet these people seek to. . . pull the bases away from popular leaders with the prospect of a job. They create divisions, and make it impossible to organize people [for community development]."[24]

2. Jobs-creation projects created distortions in the peasant economy by pulling workers away from domestic food production and fostering unsustainable patterns of household consumption.

A recent in-depth study commissioned by the National Coordination for Food Security (CNSA), the body responsible for drafting food security policy for the Haitian government, cited jobs-creation projects in the Artibonite as a serious drain on agricultural labor and a major constraint on rice production in the region.[25] In every project Grassroots International examined, peasants reported the same phenomenon. Jobs projects paid more on average than a day's work in the fields and were perceived as less physically taxing. Especially in the initial USAID-funded program, they did not leave adequate time for agricultural activities.

The fact that labor-intensive projects in the Artibonite were often conducted during peak agricultural periods heightened wage-based competition with agricultural production.[26] Many Haitians urged that jobs projects stop during periods of peak agricultural activity and that they should be banned altogether from key production areas such as the Artibonite and Cayes plains.[27] Said PAPDA's Camille Chalmers, "In the Artibonite we saw with our own eyes the quantity of rice which is ripe but rotting in the fields because the peasants don't have enough money or can't find people to work in the fields. [CARE's work] creates the paradox of rice rotting in the fields in a country where there is hunger. This is truly criminal, because it is simply a question of timing."[28]

Luckner Bonheur, agronomist and author of the CNSA-commissioned study, also pointed out that the projects will increase the relative production price of Haitian rice because they have caused the cost of labor in the region to double—from 15 gourdes per day in 1993 to 30 gourdes in 1996.[29] According to Artibonite rice grower and nationally known peasant leader Charles Suffrard, when jobs projects are operating in a given area, planters may have to offer above-minimum wages in

order to attract workers.[30] It bears noting that Haitian rice already faces stiff competition from the massive imports of U.S.-produced rice—known as "Miami rice"—fueled by trade liberalization measures. Any increase in the production price of Haitian rice will only further open the door to "Miami rice."

Defenders of jobs-creation programs argue that such projects enhance food security by increasing household revenues and enabling workers to purchase food, animals, seeds, and tools.[31] Yet most peasant organizers, agronomists, economists, local officials, and project workers consulted by Grassroots International said that while the jobs may have initially created optimism through increased spending power, total wages were rarely enough to make more than a small and fleeting difference in purchasing power. Purchases of food during the work day could easily top 10 gourdes, and any workers with fields of their own had to pay out a substantial portion of their wages to hire someone to do their work in the fields. Otherwise—as was reported in many areas—they would later find that they had forfeited harvests which would have had greater benefits in the long run.

Independent evaluations of the UCG/PCE programs corroborated these economic distortions caused by the projects. A December 1995 evaluation found that the impact on food security was likely minimal: "Given the short duration of employment. . . . it is improbable that diets changed significantly. . . . In spite of the fact that all of the workers were happy to have landed a job, there exists very little evidence of the project's benefit for agricultural production and the local economy, in the broader sense." After referring to the "mirage" effect of these short work stints, the evaluation goes on to note the pull of labor away from agriculture and other activities of longer duration.[32] A May 1996 evaluation observes that the salaries "did not permit significant changes in the living conditions of the targeted population or the true recapitalization of the workers." It also reports, "Start-up periods for the projects often coincided with planting periods."[33]

"In the Artibonite we saw with our own eyes the quantity of rice which is ripe but rotting in the fields because the peasants don't have enough money or can't find people to work in the fields."

3. Because projects were designed and implemented largely by outsiders, infrastructure work was ineffective and likely not to be maintained. Waste and corruption were rampant.

The jobs programs were largely conceived and implemented by foreign actors and were subject to various preconditions, including the PADF set-asides and circumvention of government ministries mentioned above. Another stipulation set by USAID for the JOBS Initiative was that 80% of the funding go for direct salaries—to give Haitians jobs. With administrative costs consuming another 8%, only 12% was left for other expenses such as buying materials.[34] Combined with the manual nature of the work, this ratio severely limited the durability of the rehabilitated infrastructure. In the words of David Nicola, Agricultural Minister under the Aristide/Werleigh government, "They didn't marry the objective of job creation with that of durable, lasting development. . . . They were only interested in creating jobs, and so they created these projects left and right. . . people made a little money and two or three days later, everything was destroyed."[35] Because of this,

Haitian officials asked that the World Bank allocate 40% of the subsequent PCE program's budget for labor costs, leaving 60% for material investments, community mobilization, and administration. According to UCG representatives, the World Bank was loathe to change the ratio, and only agreed to 60% labor and 40% other costs.[36]

> "Haiti has a lot of projects that are parachuted in from above, where the peasants are not really full partners in the process. Thus, money is spent, but you don't see the results."

Furthermore, many sub-projects were conducted by outsiders who did not act as true partners with "beneficiary" communities.[37] One of the results of this implantation was that work was ineffective and not maintained. A final USAID-funded evaluation of the JOBS Initiative noted, "The single most disturbing finding was that there was no systematic maintenance of the infrastructure rehabilitated by the project."[38] For Nicola, "The problem is simple. For there to be genuine development, peasants have to participate. It has to come from the base. The projects and programs must be discussed with the peasants, and the solutions must be adapted to each kind of ecological setting. Haiti has a lot of projects that are parachuted in from above, where the peasants are not really full partners in the process. Thus, money is spent, but you don't see the results."[39]

Even after Aristide's return, Grassroots International heard of a number of cases where local authorities were not abreast of PADF projects being carried out in their jurisdictions.[40] There was widespread resentment on the part of Parliamentarians and local leaders that beneficiary communities were given the impression that PCE projects were paid for by foreign NGOs. Field research confirmed that community residents and even project workers themselves were often unaware that PCE projects were conducted with money borrowed by their government.

"Alix," a Haitian government inspector of PCE projects, complained that waste and corruption were the rule rather than the exception, and that there was "a big problem" with the implementing organizations that PADF chose. "Alix" recounted that the leader of a PADF subcontractor which worked under the USAID jobs-creation program had boasted that he was now "rich for three generations" as a result of money diverted from the project. [41]

For peasant leaders like Charles Suffrard, the real costs of inefficiency and corruption will be paid down the line. "The money the UCG has to spend is money that the Haitian government has to pay back, like it or not. If the government has to pay it back, it means that the whole of the Haitian people have to pay it back. . . . Even if the people are getting it today in 36 gourde portions, they will be paying back that entire US$ 50 million tomorrow."[42]

4. Jobs-creation projects destroy the volunteerism and community spirit necessary for development. They generate dependency.

The final evaluation of USAID's JOBS Initiative reported, "A comment heard several times [was] that the project and the subsequent UCG program have destroyed a sense of volunteerism in the local population. . . . A more serious issue raised. . . is dependency. A number of comments were made to the evaluation team about individuals or organizations who felt that it was advantageous not to maintain the rehabilitated infrastructure since

another project would soon come in to rebuild the infrastructure again."[43] Independent evaluations of the follow-on UCG/PCE program raised similar concerns.[44]

Given a choice between unsustainable jobs-creation programs and support for enhancing local food production, virtually every Haitian consulted by Grassroots International would choose the latter. Many also cited the responsibility of the Haitian government to prioritize food production. In the words of a spokesperson for the Mouvman Peyizan Kwa Sen Jozef (MPK), "When a state moves in a direction which is not in harmony with that of the population, it has to carry out activities to close the people's eyes. That is what the Haitian state is doing with these labor-intensive projects. They can offer no serious response to living conditions, food problems. To the contrary, they separate the peasants from the land. They have peasants working on these activities and they never have time to work in the fields. . . . But these projects are not going to last more than two to three months. It's true that people make a bit of money, 36 gourdes a day. But that 36 gourdes can't do anything for these peasants. If, on the other hand, you helped them acquire tools [and other things necessary for production], you would begin to make a difference."[45]

Case Study Findings:

PADF/CARE Jobs-Creation Programs in the Artibonite and Northwest

Grassroots International investigated a series of jobs-creation programs managed by CARE and PADF in the Artibonite and Northwest regions of Haiti.

Case Study #1:

PADF/CARE Irrigation Rehabilitation Projects in the Artibonite

Under the USAID-financed JOBS Initiative which began under the military government, PADF granted CARE contracts to carry out four irrigation and drainage rehabilitation projects in the Artibonite Valley. The total financing for these projects was US$ 1.75 million, and, assuming no overlap, over 40,000 people were engaged in the activities.[46]

Project #002: Fossé Naboth Drain Cleaning (Villard, Deseau, etc.)
Dates: November 3, 1993–February 3, 1994
Number of workers: 1,891
Budget: 1,111,100 gourdes (approximately US$ 74,000)

Project #015: Irrigation/Drainage, Artibonite Valley (Petite Rivière, Bocozel, Grand Saline, Desdunes, Lestère)
Dates: April 11, 1994–October 21, 1994
Number of workers: 20,382 workers
Budget: 12,501,876 gourdes (approximately US$ 833,000)

Project #057: Maintenance, Upper Benoit and Colonial #1 Canals (Benoit, Lestere, Marchand Dessalines)
Dates: November 21, 1994–March 3, 1995
Number of workers: 5,486
Budget: 3,516,268 gourdes (approximately US$ 234,000)

Project #084: Irrigation/Drainage, Artibonite Valley (Pont Sonde, Petite Rivière, Grand Saline)
Dates: May 8, 1995–August 31, 1995
Number of workers: 13,370
Budget: 9,140,384 gourdes (approximately US$ 609,000)

Under the subsequent PCE program financed by the World Bank and coordinated by the UCG, PADF granted CARE another contract:

Project #U/P 204: Duclos, Fossé Naboth Ouest, Peye-Lestère (Bocozel, Deseau, etc.)
Dates: November 27, 1995–August 31, 1996
Number of person-months projected: 5,000
Budget: 5,517,213 gourdes (approximately US$ 368,000)

Grassroots International heard repeated complaints from peasant associations, agronomists, and local and regional elected officials that these PADF/CARE projects:

- were conducted in partnership with elements close to the coup regime, thus reinforcing the power of these elements; were used in certain areas in an attempt to campaign for the election of Lavalas opponents in post-coup Parliamentary elections;
- lacked any coordination with established peasant organizations and democratically elected officials;
- were poorly timed and pulled agricultural workers away from food production;
- were non-durable; and
- discouraged existing practices of voluntary community work critical for sustainable economic development.

1. These PADF/CARE projects reinforced the power of elements close to the coup regime and circumvented established peasant organizations.

Charles Suffrard is a peasant leader from Lestère, one of the Artibonite's centers of rice production and site of many labor-intensive projects. "Imagine," he explained, "how CARE and PADF were working in the field during the coup. . . in an isolated manner, without any links with local elected authorities and also without the agreement of local grassroots organizations. . . . During the coup, things were really rough here. The real representatives of the community weren't exactly [above ground]." Furthermore, he added, "Even today, UCG, PADF and CARE are negotiating more often than not with the same people that were here during the coup d'etat. Those people were torturing people, even while working under the cover of PADF and CARE." [47]

Suffrard is a leading member of the ODVA Oversight Committee, or Komite Swivi ODVA, set up under the Préval government to reform the state institution responsible for promoting rice production in the Artibonite Valley. The ODVA had been functioning for decades as a pro-Duvalier bastion of corruption and clientelism which reinforced landed elites. A significant portion of CARE's work in the Artibonite was carried out in conjunction with this "macoutized" ODVA and its employees.

Chénel Gracien is a peasant leader from Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, another key rice-producing area. Like Suffrard, he also serves on the Komite Swivi ODVA. He reported that USAID, PADF, and CARE have a history of eschewing partnership with established peasant associations in the Artibonite Valley: "If you didn't buy into CARE's [political] philosophy, you didn't work."[48] Coordinators of AGAPA and FEDDBA, two peasant associations belonging to Haiti's largest national peasant organization, the National Peasant Movement of the Papaye Congress (MPNKP), also cited CARE's partnership with right-wing elements in the Artibonite.[49]



André Louis-Jeune, project manager for all of CARE's Artibonite projects, is a former ODVA employee. He and his brother, Henry Louis-Jeune, former coordinator of CARE projects in Haiti's Northwestern Department, were cited consistently by peasant organizers, elected officials, and journalists from the Artibonite as being "close to the de facto regime," "close to FRAPH," "part of the macoute old guard."[50]

Another organization cited as a CARE partner in the Artibonite was the group CDVA. Garry Philoctete, assistant director for program and planning with CARE's Port-au-Prince bureau and charged with overseeing CARE's infrastructure rehabilitation work, described CDVA as "a group of local farmers who own land or are working on land in the Artibonite."[51] But, according to members of several peasant organizations and elected officials from the Artibonite, the CDVA is essentially a front set up by former ODVA employee Raymond Edmond and his associates to enhance the economic and political power of right-wing forces in the Artibonite Valley.[52] Ronald Deshommes, who represents Grand Saline in Haiti's Chamber of Deputies, indicated that PADF/CARE irrigation work in his district (Project #084) was used in a failed attempt to secure the election of his opponent, Wilbert Deshommes, an associate of the virulently pro-putschist Senator Dejean Belizaire. The first round of Parliamentary elections took place on June 25, 1995, with runoffs in September. CARE's work in the area began in May/June 1995 and continued into August. Deputy Deshommes indicated that André Louis-Jeune, Raymond Edmond, and their political clientele "took control of CARE's projects and financed electoral campaigns with them. . . . I was running under the Lavalas banner, and if you said you were Lavalas, you didn't get a job. . . . This lasted for the whole campaign. And what is worse, even when the campaign was over, this messed up the whole district, for it created such strong divisions in the community that getting people to work together is not easy."[53] Throughout Haiti, reports of USAID programs used to tip the electoral scales are not uncommon. (See below.)

2. PADF/CARE projects pulled agricultural workers away from food production and caused other production losses.

The creation of massive employment at periods coinciding with peak agricultural activities and paying a minimum wage that tops local rates for agricultural work caused serious distortions in the local labor market. The CARE irrigation projects in the Artibonite were extensive operations with major impact. Said peasant leader Chénel Gracien of work done in Petite Rivière (Projects #015, 084), "Some peasants preferred to work with them because they could [make money] just standing around, and they weren't aware that they would pay the consequences further down the line. . . . This meant that the rice plants were rotting, and that ripened rice wouldn't be threshed."[54]

> **"If you didn't buy into CARE's [political] philosophy, you didn't work."**

Members of APUD and AJED, two associations of rice growers in the Deseau area which group together about 200 planters each, also indicated that they suffered from a labor shortage during the implementation of the project (Project # U/P 204),[55] and Deputy Deshommes reported the same for Grand Saline (Project #084). "I warned people that they risked los-

ing their harvests, and. . . they did," said Deshommes. "The project ended, the 36 gourdes they made each day was eaten away—they had no chance to save any—and they missed out on the harvest. This really set the area back. Some lost their harvests because they couldn't find help in their fields, some didn't have time to work their own fields because they worked on the project."[56]

When Deshommes learned of USAID and PADF claims that the infrastructure work performed under the JOBS Initiative had led to the production of more than 100,000 additional metric tons of food, he was skeptical. "I don't know where they got those figures, but looking at my district, I can say that their work led people to lose their harvests as opposed to increasing them, both during and after their intervention."[57]

"The CARE/PADF work holds workers in these goof-off jobs, preventing planters from finding people to help them in the fields. . . . For there to be rice on the market, it has to be produced."

It is troubling that jobs-creation projects—which are unsustainable by nature—pulled peasants away from national production, which most Haitians believe is the only sustainable solution to food insecurity. In the words of Charles Suffrard, "The CARE/PADF work holds workers in these goof-off jobs, preventing planters from finding people to help them in the fields. . . . What [the peasant working on the jobs project] doesn't realize is that these CARE/PADF projects will one day come to an end, but peasants will still need to put food into the marketplace. For there to be rice on the market, it has to be produced."[58]

CARE's lack of planning with local peasant associations also caused serious short-term problems in some areas. Members of APUD and AJED reported that the poor planning of CARE's work on the upstream section of the Fossé Naboth irrigation canal (Project #U/P 204) spoiled rice harvests on roughly 3,000 hectares of land. In March 1996 they noticed that water was not flowing through irrigation canals in their recently planted rice fields. They quickly found that this was due to CARE's work upstream, which completely blocked the flow of water during the day. Although they protested vociferously, the water blockages continued for two more months, until CARE's project was suspended for a three-month period.[59] Frantz Nelson, head of the jobs-creation division of the UCG, used this as a case in point of the responsiveness of the system.[60] Yet, as APUD and AJED members pointed out, if CARE had coordinated with area planters at the outset, the work could have been properly timed and the problem avoided.

The same project caused similar problems for peasants from the rice-producing region of Bocozel, who took their complaints to the Komite Swivi ODVA. Explained Charles Suffrard, "The work was done when people were planting, and part of the project called for shutting off the water. . . . CARE cut off the water at the source. . . and the work went at a snail's pace, so the peasants were crying out. The Komite Swivi went to speak with CARE. They said they would be done within eight days, and another month went by. We had to call the Minister of Agriculture. . . . The project wasn't put together with the consent of local peasants. They were losing their harvests, and there was no way for them or even the

area kazek [council member] or mayor to participate in controlling the project."[61]

3. PADF/CARE projects discouraged existing practices of voluntary community work critical for sustainable economic development.

The PADF/CARE work strengthened Haiti's anti-democratic sector and demonstrated to farmers that collective organizing was not advisable. Many residents now refuse to engage in voluntary efforts, either because they are waiting for a wage-paying project or because they have learned that, when resources become available, authentic community groups are not likely to be recipients.

Regarding work in Petite Rivière (Project #015) peasant leader Joceler Jozama explained, "Manual work on little secondary drainage canals had always been done by area peasant associations with no monetary recompense whatsoever. We did this as a community in the spirit of development. Yet, when the financing came from PADF to do the work, those of us in these associations didn't know [what was] happening. This caused many problems, but since there was a de facto government, [the coup regime] at the time, we couldn't pursue the matter."[62] Pierre Richard Saintard, now a school teacher, worked as a CARE inspector in Petite Rivière on the same project. Although an overall proponent of jobs projects, he confirmed that local planters no longer organize voluntary work crews to maintain the canals because CARE and other organizations have been paying workers to do it.[63]

This was also one of the legacies of the CARE's work in Bocozel (Projects #015, U/P 204). Bernard Ethéart, head of Haiti's National Institute for Agrarian Reform, told Grassroots International that the area council member from Bocozel complained to him of "the damage CARE has created because they were paying people 36 gourdes per day to clean irrigation canals. CARE is no longer there, but you can't find anyone to clean out the canals because they expect to be paid. This is something we have known for a long time. Once you pay people to carry out activities for the community, you destroy their motivation."[64] Deputy Deshommes reported the same problems for Grand Saline (Project #084). "They have made it practically impossible to get any community activities going. . . . Whatever you propose for [people in the district] to do, they tell you there is a 36 gourdes project that will do it. And they even think you have the money for one of those projects up your sleeve and you don't want to give it to them."[65]

Case Study #2: PADF/HELP Rehabilitation of Irrigation/Drainage Structures in Verrettes

Another project carried out in the Artibonite under the USAID-funded JOBS Initiative involved the rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage structures in the district of Verrettes (Project #102). PADF documents list the implementing organization as HELP, a Protestant missionary group. The project operated from July through October 1995, was funded with 3,066,263 gourdes (approximately US$ 204,000), and gave work shifts to 4,869 people.[66]

Grassroots International visited Verrettes and spoke with several community leaders and project participants. Research found that:

- the project was conducted by right-wing elements who had supported the de facto regime and who used the work in an attempt to block the election of the local

Lavalas candidate for the Chamber of Deputies;

- the local management was fraught with corruption;
- the work was poorly designed and timed from a technical standpoint, and also pulled peasants away from agricultural production; and
- the roadside drainage canals and road repairs created by the project had completely deteriorated and were not being maintained.

The timing of the work in Verrettes coincided with the period between the first and second rounds of Haiti's Parliamentary elections after Aristide's return. According to Paul André Garçonet, who was elected as deputy for Verrettes in those runoffs, the project was used by the local, right-wing elements who controlled it to try to win votes for his opponent, Patrice Fabre. "He and his partisans in the project were going around saying, 'Lavalas supporters need not apply.'"[67]

With the exception of Garçonet, no one interviewed in Verrettes, including one of the controllers hired to work on the project, could recall the name of the implementing organization. Most simply indicated that it was initiated by outsiders from the nearby town of Borel. The controller noted that 200 to 300 people who had already worked in Borel on other jobs projects were brought in to fill slots as supervisors and workers.[68]

Peasants complained that well-established and respected local organizations were excluded, and that those locals involved were "macoutes."[69] Garçonet identified several individuals by name: supervisor Rosemont Pinard, who supported the coup; controller Jean Elie Jean-Baptiste, involved in the paramilitary group known as FRAPH; and controller Dukens, a former attaché associated with Haiti's military and an alleged torturer. He cited Guillaume Borgella, head of one of the local Baptist groups involved in the project, as a Duvalierist who owns a large amount of land in nearby Petite Rivière and has been consistently in conflict with peasant farmers.[70] Even the PADF inspector of the project contacted in Port-au-Prince described the leaders of the local church groups involved as "very dishonest people."[71]

Garçonet reported that the project's functioning was "a complete scam. Many people had to pay 20 Haitian dollars [approximately 3 days' wages] to get two weeks' work. . . . The supervisors would tell the workers, 'Take your time. . .' the logic being for the work to last as long as possible. . . . What motivates the workers is not fixing the road, but making the money. They make the money, and the economic situation renders it practically worthless. The work is done during the planting season, so people don't plant. Furthermore, a pothole is fixed in the morning and the afternoon rains wash it out again. How interesting! They said the objective was to give jobs. . . and that's all they had in mind. But what kind of jobs? Any kind. Not necessarily something to reinforce the economy, even though there were many things of this nature that could be done."[72] Both the controller to whom we spoke and the PADF inspector confirmed that local project leaders were extorting money from peasants in exchange for providing jobs.[73] Garçonet said his attempts to have the project shut down provoked threats against him from the local macoutes.[74]

The roadside repairs seem to have had little lasting value, with work sites still punctuated with deep mud holes and invaded by the adjacent river. According to the controller, the conception of the drainage work was fundamentally flawed. "It was destroyed

right away. Destroyed. After two, three weeks, the grass grew right back up again. All the drainage ditches were plugged up. Why? Because the large drainage canals further up have yet to be worked on. . . . They should have begun work at the water's source. . . . If they had planned the project with the community, perhaps they would have seen this."[75]

Local peasant organizers echoed this analysis. Furthermore, the drainage ditches that Grassroots International observed were not being maintained. Local residents queried about the sediment-clogged ditches requested another project be "sent" to pay them for maintenance work. They seemed to believe that if money had been sent in to dig the ditches, there would inevitably be more to keep them functional. It is interesting to note that, at the time PADF approved the project, the road was already slated to be completely overhauled in 1996 by a professional construction company in a massive InterAmerican Development Bank-financed infrastructure project.

Case Study #3:
PADF/MCC Work on the Mory River Irrigation System

Another project carried out under the USAID-funded JOBS Initiative was the rehabilitation of the Mory River irrigation system, located in the Desarmes district of the Artibonite (Project #045). It was conducted from October to December 1994 and funded with approximately 1,567,735 gourdes (approximately US$ 105,000).[76] Because it was cited by elected officials and Artibonite peasant organizations as one of the better labor-intensive projects,[77] Grassroots International went to investigate what factors contributed to its success.

The work to clean and drag the canals was implemented by the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), which had been working with local peasant groups for several years. Jean Rémy Azor, a peasant organizer and Desarmes resident who coordinated the work on behalf of the MCC, explained that the project had been solicited by local planters who had traditionally organized voluntary, weekend work crews to clean the canals.[78] After persuading the MCC to act as the implementing organization for the project, the peasants organized preparatory community meetings to plan the work. It was decided that work crews of roughly 1,000 residents would be renewed at the end of each month. For Azor, the positive aspects of the project were that the system was improved fairly quickly, that they had water "for a while," that cleaning the drains meant that land was recovered for rice production, and that participants received "a bit" of money which helped them "somewhat."

> **"The supervisors would tell the workers, 'Take your time. . .' the logic being for the work to last as long as possible. . . .What motivates the workers is not fixing the road, but making the money."**

Yet Azor also reported several negative impacts. The fact that 1,000 people were working at the same time depleted the labor force usually available for agricultural production. "There were a lot of people who began to complain that they couldn't find any workers to help them in their fields." Secondly, "people thought there would always be a project. . . which would replace the voluntary service that they used to provide." He also said that it was only because of the solid organization that already existed among the planters and

the fact that he and the MCC had been accompanying their work for several years that they were able to re-institute the voluntary work.

In addition, although the project "improved the system for a short while," the work the planters had really wanted done was not financed. "The system has lots of problems. All of the hardware, the gates, are destroyed. . . . There was money for labor, but not for materials that would solidify the system and make it more durable. The request was put before PADF on several occasions, especially for reinforcing walls, because three-quarters of the water from the river that feeds this system escapes into the Artibonite River. . . . PADF said only 15% of the budget could be used for administration and materials, the rest had to go for labor."

Rémy's overall impression of such jobs-creation programs is that their international funders "want to give the peasants the impression that they are improving their [economic] situation by giving them a little job, a bit of work, so they can make a little money. In that way, the peasants could be led to believe that this is the solution. . . . If you resolve the fundamental problems, the peasants will increase their production, and they won't have to buy products which come from abroad. [Then], it is possible that Miami rice and other imported products won't sell anymore."

Case Study #4:
PADF/CARE Rehabilitation of Roads in the Northwest

Under the USAID-funded JOBS Initiative, PADF awarded two contracts to CARE for road rehabilitation in Haiti's Northwestern Department:[79]

Project #009: Rehabilitation of Roads in the Northwest (Anse Rouge, Môle St. Nicholas)
Dates: May 23, 1994–May 26, 1995
Number of workers: 4,562, for 8,397 person-months
Budget: 4,648,264 gourdes (approximately US$ 290,000)

Project #018: Rehabilitation of Roads in the Northwest Region II (Anse Rouge, Jean Rabel)
Dates: May 30, 1994–May 9, 1995
Number of workers: 4,845, for 7,032 person-months
Budget: 3,807,870 gourdes (approximately US$ 238,000);

Grassroots International found that the PADF/CARE road work:

- was planned and carried out without consultation with existing community organizations;
- was poorly timed, often coinciding with important agricultural periods;
- pulled peasants away from production, reducing their ability to feed their families; and
- did not correspond to what residents would identify as their most pressing need.

In Bombardopolis, Grassroots International spoke with several peasant organizers and a local agricultural technician at the government-run District Agricultural Bureau (BAC). They indicated that road work in their area (Project #009) was done during August and September, when peasants were preparing to plant. Maurepas Faustène is a technician who works without pay at the BAC since the government cannot afford to pay him. He reported, "CARE always comes

in with their make-work programs when people are planting."[80] The General Secretary of KKP, a local cooperative with 363 members, concurred, adding, "When people are hungry, they will abandon their fields to work on the project. If it's harvest time, the harvest rots. Yet, if CARE worked in a collaborative fashion, we could suggest the appropriate timing for the project. The problem is, the worker doesn't really make all that much money working on the project. After a short time it's all gone, and they end up hungrier than before because they didn't have the time to work in their fields."[81]

Throughout the Northwest, similar testimonies of the absence of consultation with community residents and the consequences of the poor timing of the road work were heard. In La Coma, a group of peasant organizers volunteering at a local tree nursery recounted how one day in the fall of 1995, PADF/CARE personnel appeared and announced that road work (Project #018) would begin on the following Wednesday. "We have lots of free time in other periods, but they like to come when we are planting," one complained. "Even if you make a little money, its not good for you. It puts you more into debt because you don't have time to work the land."[82]

In Dubois, an organizer from the well-known national peasant organization Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen reported, "They started work in October, when people were working in the fields (Project #018). Of course, most everyone around here was interested in working, because they didn't have any cash. But even after you make a little money, it disappears, because you borrowed while you were working in order to buy a little food, and when the project is finished, you realize you didn't work your fields." She lamented, "When the U.S. provides work at the very time when people should be planting or harvesting, it is as though they want us to lose."[83]

Despite the fact that road access is one element in developing a community, another frequently heard comment was that Northwest residents have more pressing priorities. The region's farmers said they would prefer support for increasing local production for local consumption to improving roads, which largely serve to facilitate the entry of food aid and imports. In the words of the General Secretary of the Bombardopolis-based KKP, "The real problem here is production. This is an agricultural area. People grow beans, manioc. . . . Instead of building roads, it would be better to help peasants produce, give them programs to help them plant, grow, and store their crops. Now, when people harvest, all the production leaves the area because there are no ways to store it."[84]

"When the U.S. provides work at the very time when people should be planting or harvesting, it is as though they want us to lose."

At the same time, there was a certain skepticism about how durable the road repairs were, given the combination of the manual nature of the repairs and the heavy trucks that CARE regularly sends into the region with food aid. The General Secretary of KKP reasoned that CARE's work would be much better if it were planned with the community. "A lot of money was spent [on the road repair], and a lot of it was wasted." He requested that CARE conduct an evaluation of its work with local people, so that residents could provide constructive criticism.[85] Yet many Northwest residents with whom we visited voiced fear that criticism of CARE's programs (including food aid)

would lead the organization to completely boycott their community.[86]

USAID maintains that their jobs programs have put needed income into the hands of peasant households while supporting important infrastructure improvements. Grassroots International found reason to question both assertions based on its case studies in the Artibonite and Northwest. Short-term jobs that put three months' wages into the hands of poor farmers do not contribute to food security if they pull needed labor from the fields and undermine traditional practices of voluntary community labor. Infrastructure projects that are poorly planned and not durable contribute little to food security. The jobs-creation programs Grassroots International studied in the Artibonite and the Northwest exhibited these weaknesses.

Which Way Forward for Haiti?

"Don't forget, during the past year, over $500 million has been allocated for Haiti. What real impact do you see that it had?. . . The money comes in, and it goes right back out."

—Artibonite Senator Samuel Madistin[1]

"You have four or five entities responsible for the same thing and there is no coordination or planning between them. . . . The Ministries are becoming weaker and weaker. . . . All of our experience in the domain of international cooperation has shown us that development is not something they are going to give to you. You have to find it yourself."

—David Nicola, former Minister of Agriculture under the Aristide/Werleigh government[2]

USAID's Latest Food Security Strategy: "Dramatic New Direction"?

Although USAID continues to defend its comparative-advantage, import-reliant vision of food security for Haiti, several of the critiques of USAID food aid programs made in this report have been recognized by U.S. food security specialists themselves. An internal discussion paper prepared by Roberta van Haeften for USAID in 1994 provided a stinging assessment of the impact of USAID food security programs to date.[3] She concluded, "*The food assistance program, as it is currently being implemented, is doing little or nothing to help make these households more food secure beyond the time at which the food is consumed.*" 4

School lunch programs, a central component of US food aid programs since their inception,[4] were found to be inherently poorly targeted,[6] to foster dependency, to have poor local management, and to show no real impact on children's nutrition or ability to learn.[7] With regard to the *cantines populaires* which were a major vehicle for food delivery during the coup period, van Haeften cites a January 1994 evaluation which found that they were non-developmental, were poorly targeted, created dependency, made "no contribution to sustainable food security," and had "no measurable impacts on improved nutrition or health" or "on the infrastructure and agro-ecological conditions that led to the creation of such large numbers of food insecure households."[8]

In the early months of 1995, USAID and its NGO partners designed a new, five-year food security program whose cost was projected at $215 million.[9] The project paper for Enhancing Food Security II (EFS II) states, "Political and economic factors coupled with natural disasters. . . have encouraged focus on the emergency (or tran-

sitory) aspects of Haiti's food security problems rather than their underlying causes. This focus must change."[10] Although heralded as marking "a dramatic new direction" for US food aid activities,[11] much of EFS II is actually a return to past practices which have been widely discredited. Furthermore, USAID remains stubbornly wedded to the premise that revenue enhancement schemes aimed largely at enabling the purchase of imported food—not support for increased production and consumption of local foodstuffs—are the key to ensuring food security in Haiti.

Many food-for-work programs were widely criticized by both independent and AID-commissioned evaluations as reinforcing skewed power relations, stifling peasant initiatives, and being largely ineffective.

Based largely on recommendations issued in the van Haeften paper, NGO-delivered programming under EFS II is to phase out general relief and to rely on maternal child health activities (health, nutrition, and family planning), productive infrastructure projects (food- and cash-for-work schemes aimed at infrastructure rehabilitation), and "carefully targeted" school feeding programs.[12] Increased monetization of Title II resources is also foreseen.[13]

The maternal child health component of USAID food security programs was not examined in the scope of Grassroots International's research, although it bears noting that it received a positive evaluation in the van Haeften report.[14] Our research examined school feeding programs only anecdotally, yet given the sweeping critique made by van Haeften of such programs, it is hard to imagine why they are continuing.[15] The most alarming aspect of EFS II, however, is its heavy emphasis on food-for-work and cash-for-work programs, which are slated to receive between 32% and 38% of all funding.

A mainstay of USAID's food aid program up to the early 1970s, food-for-work (FFW) projects aimed at road-building, reforestation, and other community improvements were largely discontinued by the early 1980s. Many of these early FFW projects were carried out by Duvalierist-created and controlled "community councils," and they were widely criticized by both independent and AID-commissioned evaluations as reinforcing skewed power relations, stifling peasant initiatives, and being largely ineffective.[16] Indeed, van Haeften's discussion paper lists many of the criticisms that are made throughout Haiti of FFW projects[17] —criticisms that are also relevant to the cash-for-work, revenue enhancement schemes reviewed in the previous section of this report.

As USAID programming goes, so goes that of the NGOs that rely on Agency financing for the bulk of their budgets. Describing CARE's program directions, the in-country head of CARE's new Development Activities Program (DAP) explained, "In Haiti, everyone has been engaged in political activities. We want people to let go of those kinds of activities and to become more involved in development activities."[18] The bulk of the "development activities" CARE will be funding are productive infrastructure projects operating on a food-for-work basis. There will be no irrigation projects for the Northwest or other activities to support domestic food production. Rather, urban projects will focus on sanitary infrastructure and rural projects on roads. Yet peasants in the Northwest and Haitian agronomists have long argued that



this singular focus on roads may be more destructive than productive. In the absence of support for local food production, roads will only increase deliveries of food aid and the export of charcoal.[19] Without support for local food storage facilities, roads will only further encourage the exodus of food from the region at harvest time.[20]

As for the Title III program, the conditionalities to which direct food aid is subject ensure that these wheat sales will continue to operate as policy leverage—aimed at forcing the Haitian government to enact neoliberal economic policies (such as tariff reductions) and to adopt a comparative-advantage economic model which prioritizes production for export and thereby creates reliance on imported foodstuffs. Furthermore, if the Title III Accord for FY 1996 is indicative,[21] proceeds from monetization will fund food- and cash-for-work programs which stress revenue enhancement while failing to address the root obstacles to improving Haiti's capacity to produce its own food.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Based on its findings, Grassroots International recommends that the U.S. government and U.S. agencies operating in Haiti adhere to one basic principle: *Aid policies and programs should support the goal of enhancing Haiti's food security by supporting Haitian food producers.* Current policies and programs clearly are having the opposite effect.

Haitian farmer groups, professionals, government officials, and elected leaders are not waiting for the U.S. government to reform its destructive policies. They are developing alternative policy proposals and implementing their own community-based economic development projects designed to enhance food security.

Based on this rich body of experience, and drawing on the work of its Haitian partner organizations, Grassroots International recommends:

1. The U.S. government should not condition its aid to the Haitian government on the implementation of policies that undermine Haitian food producers and weaken the development of democratic institutions in Haiti.

2. The U.S. government should end pressure on Haiti to reduce tariffs, particularly on food. Haitian food producers should be protected from subsidized U.S. imports while they rebuild their productive capacity.

3. Policies should cease to emphasize short-term emergency programs, including jobs and food aid, in favor of long-term, small-scale development.

4. All programs should be designed and carried out with the full participation and approval of the affected communities, in ways that strengthen Haitian organizations and institutions—including the Haitian government—particularly at the local level.

5. Aid programs should support Haitian food producers by increasing their access to:

- land, by supporting a comprehensive land-reform program designed to transfer quality, arable land to small farmers;
- affordable credit;
- appropriate technology and training;

- infrastructure improvements, particularly irrigation and roads;
- soil restoration and reforestation programs, to improve soil fertility;
- farm animals, particularly indigenous Creole pigs;
- seeds, tools, and farm machinery to help recapitalize peasant households; and
- food storage and marketing support.

Haitian organizations have presented their alternative policy proposals to the Haitian government and to international donor countries, to little apparent effect. For example, the National Association of Haitian Agro-Professionals (ANDAH) in May 1996 presented a comprehensive proposal to enhance food security by strengthening and expanding the agrarian economy. A summary of ANDAH's proposal is included in Appendix III. The Haitian government's National Coordinator for Food Security (CNSA) made similar arguments in a draft policy proposal presented to Haiti's Prime Minister in June 1996.

Farmer groups have been even more outspoken. It would be difficult to overstate the extent to which Haitian peasant farmers reject the premises, policies, and programs the U.S. government is backing in Haiti. The National Peasant Movement of the Papaye (MPNKP) Congress, the country's largest national peasant association with over 13,000 local groups and more than 180,000 members, at its March national assembly expressed strong opposition to what it calls "the neoliberal plan."

"Neoliberal economic policy would have one believe that Haiti cannot produce and shouldn't try," the group writes. "In spite of the fact that Haiti does not have a lot of land with agricultural potential, it can produce enough food to feed its people. Haiti isn't producing because the State has yet to truly make domestic food production a priority. The country has yet to have a government with a policy for developing agriculture, because any policy aimed at developing agriculture must deal with the land issue."[22]

Calling "free trade" programs the "policies by which peasants are the first to be destroyed," the group goes on to list its main goals: "To organize ourselves to produce our own food is to build our strength in order to save the land, to carry out agrarian reform, irrigation, put in place a decent system of credit so we can produce the domestic food which will chase away food aid."

MPNKP and other peasant organizations continue to develop and implement their own community-based projects designed to improve food security. Compared to the high price tag of USAID's programs, these grassroots initiatives represent a more cost-effective way to assist communities in their own self-directed efforts to improve access to adequate supplies of food. Grassroots International's experience supporting Haitian peasant projects shows that such projects remain starved for funds, a tragedy when USAID is squandering so much money on counterproductive programs.

Among the projects MPNKP groups are carrying out:

- The Peasant Movement of Papaye (MPP), the country's oldest peasant organization, is operating a community-based soil restoration and reforestation project in five regions of the Central Plateau area. Recognizing that environmental restoration must work hand-in-hand with agricultural development, MPP agricultural specialists are organizing agroforestry brigades involving 3,000 local farmers. Each year, brigade members build small protective dams and terraces

during the dry season; then, when the rains come, members plant trees and grass to prevent soil erosion. These simple, low-technology measures protect hundreds of acres of land from environmental degradation. The high level of voluntary community participation not only keeps costs low, it ensures that this infrastructure work is maintained and that ecological farming techniques become incorporated into farmers' everyday practices. The annual cost of MPP's Agroforestry Program is just $81,516.

- In MPNKP's Northern region, the peasant alliance is carrying out a community-based program to recapitalize peasant households by distributing pairs of Creole pigs to local groups for breeding and distribution to their members. Building on previous programs by the MPP, MPNKP peasant associations in the North have developed their own program to repopulate the region with a hardier pig bred from other Caribbean stocks. In the first year, this program is distributing about 150 breeders to local associations, which will then breed the pigs for distribution to their members. The annual cost of this long-term investment in the Haitian peasantry is just $28,035.

These are just two examples of high-impact, low-cost, community-based projects that Haitian farmers have developed themselves as a response to the ongoing food insecurity in their communities. Starved for financial support, they stand in stark contrast to the expensive and largely ineffective programs that dominate USAID's portfolio in Haiti.

The Role of U.S. Agencies

One of the most troubling findings of Grassroots International's research was the consistently negative role played by the U.S. NGOs responsible for implementing much of USAID's Haiti program. The two primary implementing agencies for food aid and jobs-creation programs were CARE and PADF. Grassroots International's investigation revealed consistent complaints about their role and their effectiveness.

The following flaws were of particular concern:

- failure to consult with and involve local communities in the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects;
- failure to identify correctly and respond to local needs;
- failure to sufficiently monitor the impact and effectiveness of projects and make needed changes;
- frequent selection of Haitian counterparts who not only lack community support but are closely associated with the former military government; and
- failure to coordinate with local and regional Haitian government bodies, thereby creating projects at odds with stated Haitian priorities.

At a time when U.S. foreign aid programs are under fire from conservatives, the community of private aid agencies in the United States has a particular obligation to ensure that all funds, whether from taxpayers or private contributors, promote long-term, community-based solutions to hunger. Projects must foster self-reliance and community initiative, strengthen local democratic institutions, and break cycles of dependency. The programs Grassroots International reviewed in Haiti rarely contributed to these goals; in

many cases, they did the opposite.

Grassroots International, which as a matter of policy does not accept U.S. government funds, believes that one of the strongest factors contributing to private aid agencies' ineffectiveness in Haiti is their dependence on U.S. government funding for programs. This often leaves private aid organizations more beholden to U.S. government policies than they are to the communities they are trying to assist.

In Haiti, this has led CARE, PADF, and others to support projects that are clearly undermining rather than contributing to Haitians' determined efforts to achieve food security.

Conclusion

The Haitian people have demonstrated a tenacious commitment to building a democracy that serves the needs of Haiti's impoverished majority. With formal democracy now restored, they are determined to ensure that their elected leaders have the freedom to pursue policies that address poor Haitians' most urgent needs, particularly the need to secure an adequate diet for all Haitians.

USAID has made it clear that it does not consider Haitian agriculture viable nor increased food production a high priority. Responding to the findings in this report, one USAID official responded to a radio interviewer's questioning of why the agency did not want to help Haitian farmers grow more food by saying, "I do not believe we should be promoting self-sufficiency in Haiti."[23]

Fortunately, Haitian farmers have not given up on themselves. They remain committed to developing their own self-reliant communities in a nation that is not dependent on foreign funds or food. Haitian agronomists and foreign agricultural technicians confirm farmers' assertions that with appropriate support they can increase their production of basic foods.

If the U.S. government and U.S. aid agencies are at all committed to addressing the root causes of hunger in Haiti and building a democracy in which Haitians not only choose their own leaders but retain sovereign control over economic policies, they must rethink their current policies. They are undermining food security in Haiti. In fact, they are feeding dependency and starving democracy.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1 Author's Interview, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996.

2 Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe et Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement, "Rapport de Cooperation au Développement: 1995," Summary Version (Port-au-Prince: August 1996), p. 1.

3 Based on figures compiled from World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Commitment/Disbursement Estimates as of October 10, 1995," informal working document based on data submitted by donors, 1995; and World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Pipeline and Disbursements, November 12, 1996" (Washington: 1996).

4 *Ibid.* According to these World Bank figures, disbursements for FY95 and FY96 totaled $1,047,090,000.

5 *Ibid.*

6 Ministère de la Planification, p. 1.

7 According to World Bank disbursement documents previously cited, loans accounted for almost $1.3 billion of the $2.5 billion package.

8 Reams have been written on the forces behind SAPs and their deleterious effects both in Haiti and around the world. For a recent treatment of these issues which is both thorough and concise, see Lisa McGowan, "Democracy Undermined, Economic Justice Denied: Structural Adjustment and the Aid Juggernaut in Haiti" (Washington DC: Development Group for Alternative Policies, January 1997). For more information on the impact of SAPs in various countries, contact the Fifty Years Is Enough Campaign at 1025 Vermont Avenue NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20005 (202-463-2265). For more information on the impact of SAPs in Haiti, contact Grassroots International's partner organization, PAPDA, at Angle Rue Fremy et Ave. John Brown, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; or see various issues of *Haiti Info*, the bi-monthly, English-language bulletin of the Haitian Information Bureau, contactable at B.P. 15533, Petionville, Haiti.

9 Fritz Deshommes, *Néo-Libéralisme: Crise Economique et Alternative de Développement* (Port-au-Prince: Imprimeur II, 1995), p. 24.

10 Gerard Pierre-Charles, *L'Economie Haïtienne et sa Voie de Développement*, Second Edition (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Henri Deschamps, 1993), pp. 98-99.

11 World Bank, "Ébauche de Stratégie d'Aide du Groupe de la Banque a la République d'Haïti," draft paper dated April 11, 1996, p. 5.

12 Cited in Haitian Information Bureau (HIB), "Haiti's Agricultural Production," *Haiti Info*, vol. 4, no. 8, 1996.

13 Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA), "Plan National de Sécurité Alimentaire et de Nutrition," draft policy proposal presented to Prime Minister in June 1996, p. 10 uses a figure of 50%. Gérard Gagnon, "Food Security Issues in Haiti," draft paper prepared for the World Bank (Port-au-Prince, July 1996), pp. 15-16 uses a figure of 45%.

14 Deshommes, p. 190 uses a figure of 85%; a World Bank fact sheet uses a figure of 65%.

15 HIB, "Haiti's Agricultural Production."

16 *Ibid.*

17 CNSA, "Plan National," p. 12.

18 Association Nationale des Agro-Professionels Haitiens (ANDAH), "Les Negotiations autour du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel et le Devinir de la Production Nationale," position paper (Port-au-Prince, May 27, 1966), p. 3.

19 World Bank, Ébauche," p. 26 gives 6,000; ANDAH, "Les Negotations," p. 1 cites 15,000.

20 ANDAH, "Les Negotiations," p. 1.

21 CNSA, "Plan National," p. 18.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

23 *Ibid.*

24 MPNKP, Resolutions from National Assembly, March 1997.

25 World Bank, Ébauche," p.1 and CNSA, "Plan National," p. 7. It should be noted that while GDP figures can act as a general benchmark for understanding the economic situation in Haiti, they somewhat understate personal income. For



example, an estimated one million Haitians live abroad, and remittances are often channeled informally.

26 Haitian Information Bureau (HIB), "Haiti's Agricultural Production," *Haiti Info*, vol. 4, no. 8, 1996.

27 World Bank fact sheet; World Bank, "Ébauche," p. 8.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 5. USAID/Haiti, "An Historic Opportunity: Haiti," USAID Action Plan 1996-1997, May 1995, p. 9 puts at 20.4% the proportion of Haiti's children suffering from severe to modest malnutrition.

29 A World Bank fact sheet uses the figure of 60% for 1994; CNSA, "Plan National," p. 21 uses UNDP figures of 65% for 1995; and CNSA "Plan National," p. 7 cites Group Croissance figures of 70% for 1994.

30 Roberta van Haeften, "A Framework for Discussing the Reorientation of the Enhancing Food Security Project, the Title II Program in Particular," Second Draft, unpublished, December 1994, p. 7.

31 USAID/Haiti, Monitoring Reports.

32 World Bank, "Ébauche," p. 8.

33 CNSA, "Plan National," p. 31.

34 Deshommes, p. 190. World Bank poverty figures are more conservative but shocking nonetheless, estimating that 66% of the population lives below the poverty line.

35 *Ibid.*

36 Author's interviews with Camille Chalmers, Port-au-Prince, fall and winter 1996.

37 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 26, 1996. See also Haitian Information Bureau, "Food 'Aid,' US Rice, Undermine Local Farmers," *Haiti Info*, vol. 2, no. 24, August 27, 1994.

38 Bonheur, p. 1.

39 Advertisement of the Rice Corporation of Haiti S.A.

40 For more information on the activities of the Ehrly Rice Corporation and the Rice Corporation of Haiti, see Washington Office on Haiti, "Special Issue Report: Rice Corporation of Haiti" (Washington, October 27, 1995).

41 Bonheur, p. 1. Bonheur, p. 3 cites estimates that annual consumption of rice is about 250,000 MT, and that local production is between 124,000 and 134,000 MT. With imports of 200,000 MT, this means that a fair amount of rice is being siphoned off as contraband into the neighboring Dominican Republic, which has lower tariffs.

42 *Ibid.*

43 CNSA, "Plan National," p. 6.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

45 USAID/Haiti, "Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS): FY 1993-1997" (Port-au-Prince, October 1991), p. 6. Interestingly enough, the agricultural section is headed by the Haitian proverb, "bon tè pa pou abitan," or "good land is not left to peasants." As for the problem of environmental degradation, the document states on p. ii, "The greatest long-term contribution USAID can make to environmental preservation is through assistance in the reduction of the birth rate."

46 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 3. Two days after the CDSS document was forwarded to Washington, that same resourceful, energetic private sector was to bankroll a coup d'état, one which many analysts believe the US Embassy was involved in supporting.

48 Deshommes, p. 24.

49 USAID/Haiti, CDSS, pp. 15-16.

50 *Ibid*, p. 15.

51 *Ibid*, p. 14.

52 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 26, 1996.

53 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 27, 1996.

54 ANDAH, "Les Negotiations," p. 3.

55 Jean Luckner Bonheur, "La production de riz dans la Vallée de l'Artibonite: Note de synthèse," unpublished draft study prepared for the CNSA, July 1996, p. 1.

56 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996.

57 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 29, 1996.

58 Author's interview.

59 See USAID/Haiti, "Republic of Haiti: Enhancing Food Security II Project Paper (USAID Project No. 521-0258)" (Port au Prince, July 27, 1995), pp. 2, 12, 46-47. This analysis also becomes the basis of policy prescriptions made by others. See, for example,

Gérard Gagnon, "Food Security Issues in Haiti," unpublished draft prepared for the World Bank, July 1996, p. 18.

60 Furthermore, in places in the Artibonite, borrowers must also bring food to the lender every Saturday. This and more information on credit contained in final resolutions from the National Assembly of the MPNKP, held in Papay, Central Department, from March 19 to 23, 1997. Copies of resolutions available from the Mouvman Peyizan Papay Education and Development Fund (MPP-EDF) in Boston, MA.

61 *Ibid.*

62 CNSA, "Plan National," p. 18.

CHAPTER 2

1 MPNKP, "Introductory Letter," March 20, 1997.

2 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 29, 1996.

3 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996.

4 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, October 2, 1996.

5 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, October 2, 1996.

6 Jean-Pierre Roca and Doryane Kermel-Torres, "L'aide alimentaire en question," in Gérard Barthélemy and Christian Girault, eds., *La République Haïtienne: Etat des lieux et perspectives* (Paris: Karthala-Adec, 1993), p. 357.

7 Roca, p. 359. See also de Josh DeWind and David H. Kinley III, *AIDing Migration: The Impact of International Developmental Assistance on Haiti* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 41, 98-99. Both of these resources are excellent overviews of the uses and impact of food aid in Haiti.

8 Roca, pp. 353, 359.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 363.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 359. The four U.S. NGOs operating in Haiti during the period included CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Service (CWS), and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). With the exception of CWS, all continue to distribute food aid in Haiti.

11 USAID/Haiti, "Republic of Haiti: Enhancing Food Security II Project Paper (USAID Project No. 521-0258)," March 24, 1995, p. 4. This is an outrageous statement, given that the enforcement of the OAS/UN-mandated embargo was largely in the hands of the U.S. government. As was later revealed by Noam Chomsky in "Democracy Enhancement, II: Haiti," *Z Magazine*, Vol. 7, No. 7/8 (July/August 1994), U.S. officials even assured Texaco that it would not be prosecuted for selling petroleum to Haiti's coup regime.

12 The actual figure varies depending on the source. USAID/Haiti, "EFS II Project Paper, p. 5 uses 1.3 million; USAID/Haiti, "Enhancing Food Security," overview document dated December 13, 1995, uses "over one million."

13 USAID/Haiti, "EFS II Project Paper," pp. 4-6.

14 Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA), "Plan National de Sécurité Alimentaire et de Nutrition," draft policy proposal presented to the Prime Minister in June 1996, p. 22.

15 For a recent overview of the political origins of US food aid and its impact in various recipient countries, see Li Kheng Poh and Peter Rosset, "New Food Aid: Same as the Old Food Aid?" in Institute for Food and Development Policy (Food First), *Backgrounder*, Winter 1995. For a list of more extensive publications, contact Food First at (510) 654-4400.

16 Roca, p. 354.

17 Gelman interview.

18 DeWind, p. 98.

19 For example, USAID/Haiti, "Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS): FY 1993-1997," October 1991, p. 14 states that "The entire US assistance package, especially the balance of payments component, assures us a seat at the policy dialogue table where a wide range of economic, political and social issues can be addressed. . . . The Mission will target several priority policy reform areas, often serving as a catalyst, encouraging and facilitating G[overnment] O[f] H[aiti] acceptance of, and compliance with, I[nternational] F[inancial] I[nstitutions] conditionality." See also policy matrix which appears as an annex in "An Historic Opportunity," USAID Action Plan 1996-1997" (Port-au-Prince, May 1995).

Endnotes

20 Author's interview with Camille Chalmers, Port-au-Prince, July 1996. Much has been written (especially by Haitians) on the impact of the eradication of Haiti's Creole pig population. For two succinct accounts in English, see: Paul Farmer, "Swine Aid," in James Ridgeway, ed., *The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis* (Essential Books: Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 130-133; and Michael S. Hooper, "Model Underdevelopment," in NACLA, *Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads* (South End Press: Boston, 1995), pp. 139-141. For an analysis of the use of the eradication in USAID's push for agro-industry in Haiti, see DeWind, pp. 82-88.

21 DeWind, pp. 95-101; Roca, pp. 362-365.

22 See, for example, "PL480 Title III Grant Agreement, Fiscal Year 1996," signed on August 1, 1996, Section A-1.4: "The Cooperating Country submits to the 46th Legislature of Parliament draft legislation for the elimination of quantitative restriction and the definitive reform of the tariff regime, and the implementation of a new customs tariff code which reduces customs duties on imports to a maximum of 15 percent *ad valorem*, and those applicable to basic agricultural commodities to a maximum of 10 percent *ad valorem*."

23 For some examples, see Poh.

24 CARE-USA, "Annual Report" (Atlanta, 1995), p. 35.

25 Author's interview, Gonaïves, October 7, 1996.

26 DeWind, p. 100 even cites a 1982 USAID document to this effect.

27 *Ibid.*

28 Gérard Gagnon, "Food Security Issues in Haiti," draft paper prepared for the World Bank (Port-au-Prince, July 1996), pp. 26-27. Haitian agronomists and economists interviewed by this author, including Chalmers, Phelps, and Nicola, also expressed concern about the impact of food aid on local markets.

29 Cécile Berut, "Aide Alimentaire en Haïti," unpublished study conducted for AICF/Coopération Française (Port-au-Prince, December 1993), p. 18-19. Berut's study noted several problems with the distribution of food aid in Haiti; this author found many of the same problems still existing.

30 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 27, 1996.

31 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 28, 1996.

32 Madistin interview.

33 NSA, "Plan National," p. 18.

34 Phelps interview.

35 See the Jobs-Creation section of this report.

36 Author's interview, La Coma, October 11, 1996.

37 Information received via telephone on February 7, 1997 from a representative of the Better Business Bureau, consulting the Bureau's 1996 Charity Index.

38 Calculated from budgetary information provided in American Council for International Voluntary Action, *Interaction Member Profiles 1995-1996*, Washington, 1995.

39 Gelman interview.

40 Information received via telephone by author from representative in CARE's Atlanta headquarters, February 1997.

41 Gelman interview.

42 *Ibid.*

43 Author's interview with Orjeste Jean-Charles and others, Ti Karinaj, October 8, 1996.

44 For example, Phelps interview.

45 Ti Karinaj interviews.

46 Author's interview, Raymond, October 11, 1996.

47 Author's interview, La Coma, October 11, 1996.

48 Author's interview, Bombardopolis, October 9, 1996. It is interesting to note that Faustène must work on a volunteer basis because the government does not have enough money to pay BAC employees, a situation aggravated by the fact that most international aid by-passes government ministries and is channeled instead through foreign NGOs.

49 Viximar interview.

50 Faustène interview.

51 Métayer interview.

52 Gelman interview.

53 A mamit is the standard volume measure in a Haitian marketplace, essentially a coffee can.

54 Author's interviews, Marc Rouge, October 10, 1996. The author has witnessed food aid for sale in markets throughout Haiti.

55 Author's interviews, Cabaret, October 11, 1996.

56 Author's interview.

57 Author's interview.

58 Author's interview.

CHAPTER 3

1 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996.

2 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, September 23, 1996.

3 Author's interview of "Alix," inspector of UCG/PCE projects, October 1996 (name withheld by request).

4 USAID /Haiti, "Semi-Annual Report" (Port-au-Prince, Fall 1993), p. 43.

5 *Ibid*

6 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

7 USAID/Haiti, "Status Report" (Port-au-Prince, February 7, 1996), p. 3.

8 Author's interview with Lee Nelson, Assistant Director of PADF-JOBS, Port-au-Prince, October 3, 1996. Two other U.S. NGOs received small portions of the contract: Cooperative Housing Foundation, for urban sanitation; and Planning Assistance, for work with "local government."

9 Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), "Final Report: Jobs Creation Project," prepared for USAID for Cooperative Agreement No. 521-0241-A-00-30-34 and PL 480 Management Office (Port-au-Prince, 1996), pp. 1-4; author's interview with Lee Nelson.

10 Donald G. Brown et al., "Final Evaluation: USAID/GOH funded JOBS Creation Program Implemented by PADF" (Port-au-Prince, April 1996), p. iii.

11 Unité Central de Gestion (UCG), "Présentation de l'UCG," undated booklet introducing the Central Implementation Unit, Port-au-Prince, p. 8.

12 Author's interviews with Chalmers; author's interview with Frantz Nelson, head of PCE division of UCG, Port-au-Prince, September 24, 1996.

13 UCG, p. 26; author's interview with Frantz Nelson.

14 Author's interview with Lee Nelson.

15 See, for example: Brown et al.; PADF, "Final Report."

16 PADF, "Final Report," p. 1; USAID/Haiti, "Semi-Annual Report," p. 43.

17 Interview of PADF-JOBS Director Steve Goodwin and PADF-JOBS Agronomist Joseph Felix with Radio Haïti Director Jean Dominique on "Face à l'Opinion," April 19, 1996.

18 PADF, "Final Report," p. 8.

19 Many reports produced by both Haitian and international human rights organizations documented the repression of the coup era. For a succinct look at the rise in terror after the signing of the Governor's Island Accord, see Haitian Information Bureau, "Chronology," and Human Rights Watch/Americas and National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, "Terror Prevails in Haiti," in James Ridgeway, ed., *The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis* (Essential Books: Washington, DC, July 1994).

20 For CDS' links with repression, see, for example, Allan Nairn, "Our Man in FRAPH: Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries," in *The Nation*, October 24, 1994, pp. 460-61; Deidre McFadyen, "FRAPH and CDS: Two Faces of Oppression in Haiti," in NACLA, *Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads* (South End Press: Boston, 1995), pp. 153-157; Jane Regan, "Aftermath of Invasion: A.I.D.ing U.S. Interests in Haiti," in *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 51, Winter 1994-95, p. 56. The latter also cites Planning Assistance, another actor in USAID's Job Initiative, as working with FRAPH members.

21 PADF, "Final Report," Annex 1.

22 *Ibid.*

23 Author's interview with Frantz Nelson.

24 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, December 1996.

25 Jean Luckner Bonheur, "La production de riz dans la Vallée de l'Artibonite: notes de synthèse," unpublished, July 1996, pp. 22, 24.

26 This was corroborated by countless interviews in the field and in Port-au-Prince and biblio-



graphic research. See Turbo System, "Projet de Création d'Emplois, Crédit 2765-HA, Deuxième Evaluation Semestrielle: Rapport Final" (Port-au-Prince, May 30, 1996), p. 36. This independent evaluation of UCG/PCE programs prepared for the GOH and World Bank states, "Start-up periods for the projects often coincided with planting periods."

27 Author's interviews with Chalmers, Deshommes, Garçonet, Madistin, Nicola, Phelps, etc

28 Author's interview.

29 Author's telephone interview, Port-au-Prince, October 4, 1996. Furthermore, Turbo System, "Première Evaluation Semestrielle, Programme de Création d'Emplois: Rapport Final" (Port-au-Prince, December 20, 1995), p. 38, states that the influx of minimum wage jobs and the subsequent increase in the circulation of currency in rural area led to an overall increase in inflation in project areas, which was especially hard on those who did not receive jobs.

30 Author's interview, Lestère, October 7, 1996.

31 Author's interview with Lee Nelson; Brown et al., pp. 6-7; PADF, "Final Report," pp. 4, 10.

32 Turbo System, "Première Evaluation," pp. 23, 35, 38.

33 Turbo System, "Deuxième Evaluation," pp. 35-36.

34 Goodwin interview by Radio Haiti.

35 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 29, 1996.

36 Author's interview with Frantz Nelson.

37 Based on field research and corroborated by the independent evaluations of UCG/PCE programs which contain numerous critiques of the lack of experience and "representativeness" of implementing organizations working with PADF. See, for example, Turbo System, "Première Evaluation," p. 50; Turbo System, "Deuxième Evaluation," p. 11.

38 Brown et al., p. iii. The evaluation goes on to say on page 4, "This is, first and foremost, a short-term jobs creation program. . . . The program was never designed as a long-term economic or institutional development activity."

39 Author's interview.

40 Author's interview of Deputy Paul Andre Garçonet, Verettes, October 6, 1996; author's interview of Senator Samuel Madistin, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996; author's interview of Stephen Phelps.

41 Author's interview, October 1996 (name withheld by request).

42 Author's interview.

43 Brown et al., p. 11.

44 See, for example, Turbo Systems, "Deuxième Evaluation," p. 36.

45 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, November 18, 1996 (name withheld by request).

46 Summary information such as dates, figures, locations relating to these and subsequent projects compiled from PADF, "Final Report"; from PADF, "Projet de Création d'Emplois: Treizième Rapport Mensuel d'Activités, Août 1996" (Port-au-Prince, September 13, 1996); and from information faxed to the author on December 19, 1996 by PADF's Lee Nelson.

47 Author's interview.

48 Author's interview with Chenel Gracien and Josler Jozama, Préval, October 8, 1996.

49 Author's interviews with Jean Gehlen (AGAPA), Rosemine Belvius (AGAPA), Jordon Wifris (FEDDBA), Wilfrid Sius (FEDDBA), and others, Petite Rivière, October 5, 1996.

50 *Ibid.*; author's interview with Deshommes; author's interview with Gracien and Jozama; author's interview with Deputy Paul Andre Garçonet, Verrettes, October 6, 1996; author's interview with journalist from St Marc (name withheld by request), December 1996.

51 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, October 2, 1996.

52 Author's interviews with AGAPA, FEDDBA, Gracien/Jozama, Deshommes, Garçonet; author's interviews with APUD, AJED.

53 Author's interview.

54 Author's interview.

55 Author's interview with Richelet Rosème (APUD), Brutus Ambroise (AJED), et al., Deseau, October 7, 1996.

56 Author's interview.

57 *Ibid.*; PADF/USAID estimates reported in PADF, "Final Report," p. 6.

58 Author's interview.

59 Author's interview.

60 Author's interview.

61 Author's interview.

62 Author's interview.



63 Author's interview, Moje, October 7, 1996.

64 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 26, 1996.

65 Author's interview.

66 Compiled from PADF, "Final Report" and from information faxed to the author on December 19, 1996 by PADF's Lee Nelson.

67 Author's interview.

68 Author's interview with controller and other townsfolk, Verrettes, October 6, 1996; author's interview with AGAPA.

69 *Ibid.*

70 Author's interview.

71 Author's interview with Frantz Formoville, Port-au-Prince, October 9, 1996.

72 Author's interview.

73 Author's interviews.

74 Author's interview.

75 Author's interview.

76 Compiled from PADF, "Final Report" and from information faxed to the author on December 19, 1996 by PADF's Lee Nelson.

77 Author's interviews with AGAPA, FEDDBA, Garçonet.

78 This and subsequent information from author's interview with Jean Rémy Azor, Desarmes, October 6, 1996.

79 Summary information compiled from PADF, "Final Report" and from information faxed to the author on December 19, 1996 by PADF's Lee Nelson.

80 Author's interview with Maurepas Faustène and representatives of GADAB, KKP, and other local peasant groups, Bombardopolis, October 9, 1996.

81 *Ibid.*

82 Author's interview, La Coma, October 11, 1996.

83 Author's interview, Dubois, October 11, 1996.

84 Author's interview.

85 *Ibid.*

86 *Ibid.*; author's interviews in Ti Karinaj and at numerous dry distribution centers.

CHAPTER 4

1 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996.

2 Author's interview, Port-au-Prince, August 29, 1996.

3 Roberta van Haeften, "A Framework for Discussing the Reorientation of the Enhancing Food Security Project, the Title II Program in Particular," Second Draft, unpublished, December 1994

4 *Ibid.*, p. 18, stress in the original.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 6 states that they accounted for 50% of total programming for 1995. Jean-Pierre Roca and Doryane Kermel-Torres, "L'aide alimentaire en question," in Gérard Barthélemy and Christian Girault , eds., *La République Haïtienne: Etat des lieux et perspectives* (Paris: Karthala-Adec, 1993), p. 359 cites a share of 70% for 1986-89.

6 This is because the most vulnerable children are pre-schoolers and the poorest two-thirds of the school age population who cannot afford to attend school.

7 van Haeften, pp. 7-8.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

9 USAID/Haiti, "Republic of Haiti: Enhancing Food Security II Project Paper (USAID Project No. 521-0258)," March 24, 1995, p. 13. This figure includes $150 million worth (188,500 MT) of Title II commodities and almost $15 million generated from the monetization of Title II and III commodities.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 1

11 USAID/Haiti, "Enhancing Food Security," overview document dated December 13, 1995 (Port-au-Prince, 1995).

12 The aimed programming mix is reported differently in different USAID documents. USAID/Haiti, "Republic of Haiti: Enhancing Food Security II Project Paper," p. 19 reports FY 2000 targets to be 40% maternal child health, 32% productive infrastructure, and 28% school feeding. The subsequent USAID/Haiti, "Enhancing Food Security," overview document, reports FY 2000 targets to be 47.2% maternal child health, 38.3% food-for-work, and 14.5% school feeding.

13 According to author's interview with ANDAH agronomist Stephen Phelps, not all monetization will take place at the grassroots level. Haiti's biggest food aid donors, including the U.S., Canada, and the European Union, are soon planning to allow merchants to bid for food aid stocks, which they will import and resell on the local market. Furthermore, it bears noting that many of the changes in international food aid policy—including the ratcheting down of the number of food aid beneficiaries, the desire for more targeting, the trend toward increased monetization, and the experimentation (on the part of Canadian and European donors) with local purchases—are largely driven by the global reduction in surplus stocks of cereals and the rising costs associated with their procurement, delivery, and management. It was this dwindling of international cereal stocks that provoked the FAO conference on food security issues held in November 1996 in Rome.

14 van Haeften, pp. 6, 10-11.

15 USAID may be using this program to target rewards to schools applying educational reforms which it deems positive. See van Haeften, p. 28.

16 Roca, p. 359; Josh DeWind and David H. Kinley III, *AIDing Migration: The Impact of International Developmental Assistance on Haiti* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 53; Gérard Gagnon, "Food Security Issues in Haiti," draft paper prepared for the World Bank (Port-au-Prince, July 1996), pp. 25-26.

17 van Haeften, pp.11-12. Reporting the problems as though vestiges of a past era, van Haeften noted, "Projects were poorly selected; projects frequently were not well designed technically and did not receive the necessary complementary support; participants/beneficiaries were not sufficiently motivated; some infrastructure is built which is not maintained by the community; and it promotes a feeling of dependency because participants are seen to be accepting a 'handout' rather than receiving wages or cash payments; programs were taken over by community elite and only those under their patronage benefitted. Of course, there were also many rumors and charges of program abuse, including corruption and mismanagement of the food distribution."

18 Quote and program information from author's interview with Kalai Abdel-Hamid, Gonaïves, October 8, 1996. Haiti's grassroots leaders would argue— with corroboration from Haiti's history books—that political pressure in the form of grassroots organizing and lobbying is essential for furthering the potential of equitable and sustainable development.

19 A 1992 study by the National Association of Haitian Agro-Professionals (ANDAH) estimated that 40% of the charcoal sold in Port-au-Prince was produced in the districts of Môle St Nicholas and Bombardopolis, both in the Northwest. Cited in Haitian Information Bureau, "Crisis in NW Raises Food Aid Issue," *Haiti Info*, vol. 5, no. 8, March 22, 1997.

20 Author's interview with Ansi Viximar, Port-au-Prince, August 28, 1996, echoed in other interviews conducted with peasant producers in the Northwest.

21 "PL 480 Title III Grant Agreement, Fiscal Year 1996," Article III, Annex A, p. 19 lists the priorities for proceeds from wheat sales as being activities which rehabilitate productive infrastructure, generate employment, and increase incomes. This indicates cash-for-work and food-for-work "jobs creation" schemes, which our research and that of others have found to be not only non-developmental, but actually destructive to the process of development.

22 MKNKP, "Introductory Letter," dated March 20, 1997.

23 Interview with Len Rogers, USAID acting assistant administrator for the Bureau of Humanitarian Response, and Tim Wise, Grassroots International Executive Director, "The World," BBC radio, February 13, 1997.

Appendix I

Research on Aid and Food Security in Haiti

List of Sources Interviewed

"ALIX", anonymous source (October 1996).
Government inspector of UCG/PCE projects.

AZOR, Jean Rémy (October 6, 1996; Desarmes).
Animator with the Mennonite Central Committee in Desarmes; responsible for PADF/MCC work on Mourry irrigation system.

BARTHÉLEMY, Gérard (October 28, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
French sociologist and author on development issues; round-table discussion on development strategies with Inter-Aide.

BERUT, Cecile (September 23,1996; Port-au-Prince).
French aid worker, formerly with A.I.C.F.

BONHEUR, Jean Luckner (October 4, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Agronomist who has done extensive research work in the Artibonite Valley, currently working with the Ministry of Agriculture at the National Credit Bank.

CARE-Bombardopolis (October 9, 1996; Bombardopolis).
Agronomist Levael Eugene, working with PLUS activities, and Garry PÉTIGNY, supervisor of food aid.

CARE-Gonaïves (October 8, 1996; Gonaïves).
Jean Wilbert LAMARRE, head of dry distribution; Kalai ABDEL-HAMID, head of infrastructure program; and Agronomist Judi Cael GUSTIN, working on reforestation projects.

CARE-Port-au-Prince (October 2 - 3, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Food-assisted development manager PHIL GELMAN, Garry PHILOCTETE of the Cash for Work division and Greg BRADY of the PLUS division.

CHALMERS, Camille (various interviews, fall and winter 1996; Port-au-Prince)
Executive Director, Haitian Platform to Demand Alternative Development (PAPDA); former Chief of Staff for President Jean Bertrand Aristide; economist.

Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA) (August 27, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
DAMAIS, Gilles. French technician from IRAM, funded by the European Community to work with CNSA.

DORNEVILLE, Jean René and GUISPINVIL, Wisgurt (October 6, 1996; Petit Rivière)
Director and associate director of Kowodinasyon Oganizasyon Dèzyem Seksyon Ti Rivye Latibonit (KODESTA), a coalition of peasant organizations in the second sub-district of Petit Rivière de l'Artibonite; carried out UCG/PCE canal work

ETHEART, Bernard (August 26, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Director of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INARA).

FAUSTENE, Maurepas (October 9, 1996; Bombardopolis).
Reforestation technician with the District Agricultural Bureau (BAC) in Bombardopolis.

FORMOVILLE, Franz (October 1996; Port-au-Prince).
PADF Inspector.

GARÇONET, Paul André (October 6, 1996; Verettes, Port-au-Prince and various)
Deputy representing district of Verettes.

GIYE, Elisnè (October 10, 1996; Mare Rouge).
Responsible for tree nursery in Savanne Môle for UCG/PADF/GRAF project.

GRACIEN Chenel and JOZAMA, Jocelyn (October 7, 1996; Préval)
Members of local peasant association and Komite Swivi ODVA.



JEAN, Guillaume (October 16, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Member of the Cooperative of United Fishers of Môle St Nicolas (COPUMOS).

Komite Swivi ODVA (April 20, 1996; Bokozel).
Meeting attended by author.

LAFLEUR, Jean Plekanove (October 9, 1996, Môle St. Nicolas).

PADF Inspector.

MADISTIN, Samuel (August 30, 1996; Port-au-Prince)
Senator representing the Artibonite Department.

MATHIEU, Philippe (August 22, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
In charge of agricultural programs for the Prime Minister's office.

NICOLA, David (August 29, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Former Minister of Agriculture under the Aristide/Werleigh government, now works with Groupe de recherche pour le développement (GRD).

PADF (October 3, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Lee NELSON, Assistant Director of Jobs Creation division of the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), former employee of USAID/Haiti.

"PADF Controller" (October 1996; Artibonite Department).

PHELPS, Stephen (various times in 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Agronomist affiliated with ANDAH.

Projet Integré de Sécurité Alimentaire du Nord-Ouest (PISANO) (October 10, 1996; Jean Rabel).
Edsel POLYNICE, head of infrastructure projects for the Integrated Project for Food Security in the Northwest.

SAINTARD, Pierre Richard (October 7, 1996; Moje).
Inspector for CARE canal work during 1992-93; member, Society for the Advancement of Moje (SAM).

SUFFRARD, Charles (various times, October 1996 to January 1997; Port-au-Prince).
Member, Komite Swivi ODVA/SODABA; coordinator of the Movement for the Development of Petit Jardins (MDPJ).

Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen (August 28, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Ansi VIXIMAR, member (recently re-elected), of the national coordinating committee of Heads Together Little Haitian Peasants.

THELUSMOND, Ronel (October 2, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Agronomist working in the Artibonite with the Center for Research, Action and Development (CRAD); formerly with the Project for the Integrated Development of Desarmes (PDID).UCG (September 24, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Frantz NELSON, head of Jobs Creation division of the UCG.

URFIE, Jean Yves (August 24, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Publisher of *Libète*, Haiti's only Creole language weekly.

VAN VLIETT, Geert (September 24, 1996; Port-au-Prince).
Responsible at the time for IDB's agricultural portfolio in Haiti.

In addition, there were interviews in the field with dozens of food aid recipients, "job" workers, and members of peasant groups, including: AGAPA, FEDDBA, Gwoupman Solidaritè, National Congress of the Peasant Movement of Papaye (MPNKP); APUD and AJED in Deseau; GADAB, APAB and AJIDEB in Bombardopolis; and Tèt Kole members throughout the Northwest.

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

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Appendix II

International Aid To Haiti Since Aristide's Return
Commitments and Disbursements by Sector, in $000

	Projected		Actual		Actual		Projected	
	Total	%	FY 94/95	%	FY95/96	%	FY97	FY98+
Balance of Payments	483.71	19.1	217.9	42.3	86.33	16.2	128.36	51.12
Governance	274.67	10.8	68.0	13.2	107.92	20.3	33.62	65.13
Humanitarian Assistance	136.34	5.4	88.2	17.1	26.64	5.0	13.25	8.25
Agriculture	176.86	7.0	5.6	1.1	47.79	9.0	48.80	74.67
Environment	52.06	2.0	1.4	.3	5.21	1.0	13.45	32.01
Health	186.36	7.4	14.5	2.8	75.39	14.2	30.20	66.31
Education	146.01	5.8	4.9	.9	26.7	5.0	17.30	97.11
Transport	252.11	10.0	28.6	5.5	4.96	1.0	117.89	100.67
Energy	92.95	3.7	8.2	1.6	42.48	8.0	23.44	18.83
Water/Urban Infrastructure	162.05	6.4	22.2	4.3	36.35	6.8	37.73	65.77
Private Sector Development	93.63	3.7	.3	.1	15.91	3.0	37.52	39.90
Other Categories	472.82	18.7	55.7	10.8	55.91	10.5	77.15	284.07
Total	**$2,529.58**	**100.00**	**$515.6**	**100.00**	**$531.49**	**100.00**	**$578.69**	**$903.84**

SOURCE: Figures compiled from World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Commitment/Disbursement Estimates as of October 10, 1995," informal working document based on data submitted by donors, 1995; and World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Pipeline and Disbursements, November 12, 1996" (Washington: 1996).

U.S. Aid to Haiti Since Aristide's Return
Commitments and Disbursements by Sector, in $000

	Projected		Actual	Projected	
	Total	%	FY95 & 96	FY97	FY98+
Balance of Payments	92.80	21.0%	92.80	0.00	0.00
Humanitarian Assistance					
Title III Food Security	25.00		20.00	5.00	0.00
Title II Food Security	32.50		32.50	0.00	0.00
Total	**57.50**	13.0%	**52.50**	**5.00**	**0.00**
Governance					
Police Training	62.00		49.50	6.50	6.00
Democracy Enhancement Project	20.20		10.00	5.00	5.20
Policy and Administrative Reform	19.44		9.75	4.89	4.80
Administration of Justice	15.36		6.70	4.33	4.33
Local Governance	13.00		13.00	0.00	0.00
Elections Support	10.80		10.80	0.00	0.00
Demobilization	8.00		8.00	0.00	0.00
Total	**148.80**	33.65%	**107.75**	**20.72**	**20.33**
Agriculture					
Productive Land Use Systems	14.10		12.50	0.80	0.80
Coffee Project	3.85		3.25	0.60	0.60
Seed Production	0.94		0.94	0.00	0.00
Total	**18.89**	**4.3%**	**16.69**	**1.40**	**.80**
Environment					
Environmental Assistance Package	15.60		1.60	7.00	7.00
Targeted Watershed Management	1.71		1.71	0.00	0.00
National Environmental Action Plan	0.75		0.45	0.30	0.00
Total	**18.06**	**4.1%**	**3.76**	**7.30**	**7.00**
Health					
Health Systems	41.60		13.60	14.00	14.00
Voluntary Agencies for Child Survival	16.80		16.80	0.00	0.00
Family Planning	11.04		11.04	0.00	0.00
Urban Health	6.55		6.55	0.00	0.00
AIDS Prevention	4.96		3.72	0.62	0.62
Drug Abuse Prevention	0.62		0.52	0.05	0.05
Total	**81.57**	**18.4%**	**52.23**	**14.67**	**14.67**
Education					
Primary Education	12.46		9.52	1.47	1.47
Scholarship Program	0.91		0.91	0.00	0.00
Total	**13.37**	**3.0%**	**10.43**	**1.47**	**1.47**
Private Sector Development					
PRET/Economic Growth	8.02		5.02	1.50	1.50
Provincial Entreprise Development	1.78		1.78	0.00	0.00
Total	**9.80**	**2.2%**	**6.80**	**1.50**	**1.50**
Other					
Program Support	1.98		1.28	0.35	0.35
Total	**1.98**	**0.4%**	**1.28**	**0.35**	**0.35**
Totals	**442.77**	**100.00**	**344.24**	**52.41**	**46.12**

SOURCE: Figures compiled from World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Commitment/Disbursement Estimates as of October 10, 1995," Informal working document based on data submitted by donors, 1995; and World Bank, "Haiti: Donor Pipeline and Disbursements, November 12, 1996" (Washington: 1996).

Appendix III

Strengthen and Expand The Agrarian Economy

Recommendations From Haiti

The National Association of Haitian Agro-Professionals (ANDAH), the largest association of agronomists in Haiti, released the following recommendations on development in Haiti in May 1996, during negotiations between international financial institutions and Haiti's government.

**Recommendation 1:
Reinforcement of National Food and Agricultural Production**

ANDAH proposes making agriculture the foundation for rejuvenating Haiti's economy. Agricultural stabilization would provide long-term means of livelihood to more than five million people living in the countryside. It would also allow farmers to create links with agriculture-based industries, and would mean reversing the current spiral of decapitalization—the loss of land, tools and animals and the resulting economic devastation—facing peasant farmers.

ANDAH calls for:

- agrarian reform that increases productivity and achieves a more equitable and secure distribution of land;
- massive allocation of credit to peasant farmers;
- rehabilitation and expansion of irrigation systems to maximize use of prime agricultural land in Haiti's lowlands;
- reinforcement of storage capacities and modernization of grain mills and other agricultural production methods;
- development of certain export products, especially coffee; and
- development of a natural resources policy, with a focus on national energy policies.

**Recommendation 2:
Liberalization of Commerce**

Reducing customs tariffs on U.S. food imports—one requirement of structural adjustment policies—without replacing the lost revenues through other tax sources is reducing the ability of the government to invest in agricultural production and social programs.

ANDAH recommends:

- eliminating all tariffs on agricultural sector production resources (for example fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, agricultural equipment, etc.);
- increasing import duties for certain competitive agricultural products (rice, corn and beans) to a level allowing importers to profit without provoking an increase in consumer prices;
- reinstating the sales tax on imported rice, so as not to price local rice farmers out of the market;
- increasing import duties on luxury and non-essential goods (for example, alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, luxury vehicles, etc.), to discourage imports and reserve hard currency;
- decreasing consumer prices by eliminating all tariffs and taxes on certain non-competitive food items (sugar, flour, oil); and
- establishing sanitary controls over imported food products.

Recommendation 3: Investments
To create lasting revitalization of the agricultural sector and to guarantee food security, quality investments must target problem areas.

ANDAH recommends that:

- funds borrowed by the Haitian government, especially those managed by its Central Implementation Unit (which has been focused on administering short-term jobs-creation projects) be used for long-term investments in infrastructure and agricultural development;
- the Central Bank of Haiti should adopt measures that induce private banks to finance the agricultural sector;
- loans obtained through negotiations with the international community should be used primarily to boost national production; and
- investments should be made within the context of real decentralization.

Appendix IV

Grassroots International's Haiti Food Security Program: Low-Investment, High-Impact Aid

Grassroots International (GRI), a fourteen-year-old aid and development agency based in Boston, Massachusetts, supports democratic social change in the Third World through partnerships with community-based groups building economic and social justice.

GRI provides direct assistance—both cash grants and material aid—to organizations that are making real, measurable differences in people's lives. An independent agency committed to progressive social change, GRI works with more than 30 community-based partner organizations—organizations that are transforming their societies as they struggle to secure social, political, economic and cultural rights. Since its founding in 1983, Grassroots International has raised and sent more than $15 million in cash grants and donated material aid to our partners, without accepting any government funding.

The Haiti Food Security Program is one of Grassroots International's six current programs. Below are descriptions of the other five.

Eritrea Reconstruction and Development Program

Africa's newest nation is struggling to rebuild itself after its three-decade-long war for independence. Grassroots International has supported the Eritrean people since 1983. The Eritrea program is GRI's largest, supporting model efforts that offer hope for sustainable development throughout the Horn of Africa, including soil conservation and reforestation, economic development for women, a rural public health program, and youth empowerment.

Mexico Indigenous Rights and Development Program

The Mexico Program is Grassroots International's newest, begun as the United States, Mexico and Canada were planning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The program was crafted to respond to the economic and social dislocations created by economic integration, as

well as the human rights crisis caused by more than 67 years of corrupt, single-party rule in Mexico.

Palestinian Democratic Development Program

For more than a decade, Grassroots International has supported Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution to the conflict in the Middle East. After the peace accords were signed in 1993, GRI expanded its Middle East work. It now supports eight community-based organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that are making critical contributions to four key components of autonomy, peace, and security: physical and mental health care, economic development, human rights and democracy, and women's equality.

Philippines Environmental Program

The Philippines Program is one of Grassroots International's oldest, begun when dictator Ferdinand Marcos was still firmly entrenched in power in the mid-1980s. Two years ago GRI focused the program on a critical issue in the Philippines: the environment. Our partners are organizing Filipinos affected by the deadly pollution of two very powerful entities: the U.S. military and the transnational mining industry.

South Africa Women's Program

Grassroots International began supporting the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa in 1985. During the embargo that helped pressure the government to recognize the black majority, GRI was one of the few U.S. agencies to receive a special permit to channel aid to anti-apartheid organizations in the country. Now, in the new South Africa, GRI is supporting an important—and often neglected—sector of the nation's progressive movement: women. Some of the most exciting new models for women's organizing to be found anywhere are being tested in the new South Africa.

Grassroots International has always focused on regions of the world where U.S. policy has been a key obstacle to positive change. GRI's relationship with its partner organizations goes far beyond the delivery of cash grants and material aid. GRI offers political solidarity and, at our partners' request, advocates on their behalf in the United States. Mariclaire Acosta, President of the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, states, "Grassroots International is a partner in the truest sense of the word—active, creative, and willing to take risks to support social change."

Haiti Food Security Program
Partner Description:
Peasant Movement of Papaye

The Peasant Movement of Papaye (or MPP, its Haitian Creole acronym) is one of the strongest community-based organizations in Haiti. Founded in 1973, it is the oldest peasant association in the country, and has more than 30,000 members in Haiti's Central Plateau. For more than two decades, MPP's cooperative stores, credit programs, libraries, literacy programs, agricultural projects, and other self-help projects have improved life for some of the poorest people in the hemisphere.

Because of its critical role in helping to elect former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, MPP became a particular target of

the military crackdown in the countryside after the 1991 military coup. Since 1992, Grassroots International has supported MPP's work to promote and provide resources for organizational, economic, and agricultural development for tens of thousands of Haitian families. In 1997, Grassroots International is supporting two MPP programs: the Agroforestry Program and the Women's Revolving Loan Program.

Agroforestry Program

The MPP recognizes that environmental restoration must work hand-in-hand with agricultural development to reverse degradation of the land caused by acute economic and political crisis. Before the 1991 coup, MPP's agroforestry projects operated throughout the Central Plateau with members trained to conduct reforestation and soil conservation projects. Repression under the military dictatorship nearly destroyed the program.

MPP now operates a revitalized Agroforestry Program in five regions of the Central Plateau—begun in 1996 and scheduled to become fully operational this year. Agricultural specialists and trained assistants will organize and mobilize agroforestry brigades, involving three thousand local farmers. This broad participation ensures that the program is supported by local communities and is responsive to their needs.

The low-technology nature of the program is the key to its success. The Agroforestry Program's activities fall into three categories: soil conservation, seedling production and planting, and training in ecological farming techniques. Each year members of the agroforestry brigades build small protective dams and terraces during the dry season. During the rainy season they plant trees and strips of grass to stem the erosion of the land. In 1997 these simple measures will protect hundreds of acres from environmental degradation.

Women's Loan Program

The Women's Loan Program of MPP is an integral part of economic reconstruction and development in the Central Plateau.

Because many male family members were killed, injured, or forced to flee during the coup period (1991 to 1994), many Haitian women are now heads of households. In 1992, as part of its emergency aid work, MPP began a small credit program providing individual loans averaging US$ 40 to rural women, many of whom are small farmers.

The loans help women develop sources of income through projects including small commerce, market gardening, animal husbandry, handicrafts businesses, and restaurant operation. This year, Grassroots International is supporting MPP's efforts to expand the program to serve 4,000 women.

Through the program, local women have access to loans at an annual interest rate of 12%. In villages where local moneylenders routinely charge 120% to 480% percent interest annually, MPP's program represents the only real access to credit—and therefore the only hope of meeting their families' needs—that is available to rural women.

Haiti Food Security Program Partner Description: National Peasant Movement of the Papaye Congress

The National Peasant Movement of the Papaye Congress (or MPNKP, its Haitian Creole acronym) is Haiti's largest and most

broad-based national peasant organization, with more than 100,000 members. The MPNKP was founded in 1991, growing out of earlier assemblies of regional peasant groups. It drew much of its early leadership from the much older and better-known Peasant Movement of Papaye (MPP).

MPNKP is made up of local affiliates throughout the country, and provides member groups with technical assistance, leadership training, and a platform for national political work and advocacy. Grassroots International is supporting MPNKP's leadership training and small-scale agrarian development efforts in Haiti's Northern Region.

Comprehensive Leadership Development Project

One of MPNKP's most important contributions is building leadership at the local level—a prerequisite to self-sufficiency.

MPNKP trains local peasants as leaders in their communities, where they plan and administer economic development projects that address the root causes of community problems. The program builds self-sufficiency by training individuals in the Northern Region to develop and promote animal husbandry, sustainable agriculture, and income-generating projects.

MPNKP's trainings focus on a range of topics, including soil conservation techniques, problem solving and social issues, project development techniques, agrarian reform and structural adjustment policies, and education.

Agrarian Development in the Northern Region

In many parts of rural Haiti, agrarian and economic development are synonymous with the repopulation of the Creole pig. In fact, the pig is commonly referred to in Haitian Creole as the "peasant's savings bank." For centuries, small farmers traded and bartered pigs for land, food, debt payment, and other cost-of-living expenses.

In the early 1980s the deadly African Swine Fever swept through the Dominican Republic. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Haitian government under Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier responded by eliminating Haiti's Creole pig population—despite the fact that Haitian pigs seemed resistant to the disease. Using $23 million in funds from private North American agricultural interest groups, more than one million pigs—with an estimated value of $600 million—were slaughtered. The planned repopulation of Haiti with U.S. pigs largely failed. The result: a national economic crisis that left hundreds of thousands of poor farmers empty-handed.

For the past few years, the French government has been collaborating with Haitian agronomists and popular organizations to cross-breed imported U.S. pigs with Creole-type pigs from Martinique, Guadeloupe, and other Caribbean islands. A hardier breed is emerging, making it clear that repopulation of the Creole pig is possible.

MPNKP member groups in the Northern Region play a significant role in this repopulation effort. In the first year, 130 local organizations will be involved in the program. Women are given special priority as new livestock owners, receiving at least one-third of the more than 500 pigs to be distributed. Estimated breeding and survival rates indicate that every member of the local organizations should have at least one pig within three years. MPNKP is pioneering this kind of small-scale recapitalization of peasants—an effort that is essential to food security for Haiti.

Haiti Food Security Program Partner Description:
Haitian Women in Solidarity

In rural villages scattered across the Haitian countryside and in the squatter slums of Port-au-Prince, the organization Haitian Women in Solidarity (or SOFA, its Haitian Creole acronym) brings Haitian women together to work for justice, human rights, and economic autonomy. Founded in early 1986 just after the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, SOFA promotes Haitian women's struggle for social justice and economic liberty.

SOFA emerged on the international scene just as the period of military rule was ending in 1994. It was the first women's group to challenge directly the use of rape as a systematic method of torture by the Haitian army. Because there is a strong social stigma attached to rape victims in Haiti, SOFA's work on this issue is an example of the organization's courage.

Revolving Loan Fund for Women in Agriculture

With the return of democracy, SOFA turned part of its attention to economic issues. Many women living in agricultural regions have been unable to farm since the 1991 coup because they cannot afford seeds and other materials. To change this, SOFA has expanded its loans to women in the rural Artibonite area, Haiti's "rice basket."

The flood of food imports—particularly rice from the United States—is wreaking havoc on the viability of rice farming in the Artibonite. SOFA's work will both bring women back into agricultural development and diversify agriculture in the region. In 1996 Grassroots International provided a grant of US$ 8,000 that funded loans to 200 women in several different communities. The project has an impact on the entire community, making more food available locally at affordable prices. Loans to Artibonite women are made and repaid in seeds so that the recipients do not have to worry about the fluctuating cash value of agricultural products.

Haiti Food Security Program Partner Description:
Haitian Platform for Alternative Development

The Haitian Platform for Alternative Development (or PAPDA, its Haitian Creole acronym) is a coalition of fifteen small farmers organizations, unions, and other non-governmental organizations. PAPDA is headed by Camille Chalmers, Chief of Staff for former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide during his exile. The coalition focuses on research, analysis, and strong education programs.

Promoting Alternative Development

PAPDA is the premier Haitian organization analyzing the structural adjustment policies promoted by USAID and other international financial institutions. PAPDA studies the impact of many aspects of structural adjustment on Haiti: privatization of state-owned businesses, trade liberalization, reductions in government spending and services, increased reliance on food imports, and expansion of export-oriented assembly industries.

PAPDA advocates development policies that place the interests of the Haitian people first, conducting educational seminars to inform rural communities about the effects of structural adjustment and plan resistance strategies in Haiti. It plays a critical role in maintaining the viability of Haiti's rural sector and economy. Working directly with small farmers and rural organizations, it offers solutions to real-life problems in farming, animal husbandry, and other rural industries. It works with the media and other organizations concerned about food security issues, and collaborates with community groups to test alternative development strategies.